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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation studies a unique learning by teaching opportunity in post-merger 
integration where the acquirer firm needs to train its existing and new employees during 
the integration process followed by an acquisition of a new affiliate. I first develop a 
conceptual framework of learning by teaching by proposing three envisioned mechanisms 
that relate to a distinct set of characteristics of knowledge (Chapter 2). While the learning 
by teaching mechanism has been relatively neglected in organizational studies, I address a 
research context where teaching or, in other words, training is heavily associated with 
integration activities, particularly in the banking industry where acquisitions is a common 
strategy of firm expansion. I explore how superior performance of the acquiring bank 
holding company facilitates a top-down management style when integrating the newly 
acquired bank unit and how under such conditions the acquiring bank holding company 
can benefit from learning by teaching (Chapter 4). I then extend my study to the process 
level of managerial improvement in loan risk management that results from a post-merger 
teaching opportunity. In particular, I adopt a delayed recognition model that analyzes how 
a teaching opportunity during integration leads to the improvement in timeliness and 
accuracy of bank managers’ capability in forecasting loan default (Chapter 5). The 
quantitative analyses and theoretical arguments are triangulated with qualitative research 
that includes interviews with managers and top executives from both the acquiring and 
acquired banks. Taken together, this dissertation contributes to the organizational learning 
xiii 
 
and evolutionary literature by shedding light on a core theoretical construct that extends 
avenues for future research and provides pragmatic implications to firm managers of the 
learning benefits that stem from coordination and training during firm integration and from 
the ex-ante efforts made internally in preparation for the dynamic change.        
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Overview 
Introduction 
Firms that acquire different entities need to cope with two distinct tasks after the 
integration. One is securing any synergy effects that motivated the acquisition where the 
acquiring firm takes advantage of the enhanced facilitation in its functions through the 
combination of knowledge and capabilities (Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988; Rumelt, 
1974; Zhou, 2011). The other is taking care of the potential post-acquisition disruption in 
routines and processes. In particular, the acquired entity suffers from a reduction in the 
degree of autonomy while the acquiring firm confronts interruption when the acquired 
entity brings new and unfamiliar knowledge and technology to the merged firm (Kaplan 
and Henderson, 2005; Rawley, 2010). To unfold the question on how to reach greater 
efficiency in coping with these two tasks, a large body of finance and strategic management 
research explores the effectiveness of acquisitions as well as the integration forms and 
conditions that would maximize post-merger performance (Ramaswamy, 1997; Kim and 
Finkelstein, 2009; Capron and Mitchell, 2009; Zaheer, Castaner and Souder, 2011).  
Firms that acquire for the attainment of knowledge and capabilities would typically 
select a target firm that possess superior or complementary knowledge and capabilities 
relative to the acquiring firm. Firms that acquire other entities in order to expand in terms 
of size and market power, on the other hand, would select a target firm that would cause 
minimal amount of disturbance yet provides access to new markets. These target firms are 
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typically underperforming firms because high performers are less incentivized to sell 
themselves out to their rivals unless offered a high price premium. Whichever the exact 
motivation is to the acquisition, prior research advises us that the acquiring firm expects to 
learn new information on technology, market, function, or even culture held by the target 
firm through the merger. Under mergers where there is little to gain in terms of 
complementary knowledge and capabilities, however, it is yet unclear how firms survive 
the large grade of disturbance during the post-merger integration process and, moreover, 
how they generate positive returns. A typical example of such merger would be the case 
when firms acquire other firms to expand its business scale rather than the augmentation 
of its knowledge reservoir. In this dissertation, I attempt to provide potential answers to the 
phenomenon of interest and identify an additional learning mechanism that the acquiring 
firm can exploit from in the context of a highly efficiency-disrupting post-merger 
integration.  
I build my theoretical perspectives upon the organizational literature that focuses 
on the development of knowledge and capabilities. Extant research has extended our 
understanding on organizational learning in terms of the specific mechanisms and 
foundational constructs. A large body of research explores how firms acquire new 
knowledge and capabilities over the course of accumulating experiences, which involves a 
repetition of trials and errors. Another stream of research focuses on a more cost efficient 
and risk aversive approach to learning, which is learning by observing the experiences of 
other organizations (Starbuck, 1983; Nonaka, 1988; Argote, 1999; Levinthal and March). 
While the literature has advanced our comprehension regarding the search process of 
distant knowledge as well as its influence on strategic decisions, the mechanisms through 
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which an organization learns from its own knowledge and capabilities remain 
underdeveloped. This dissertation aspires to unravel the mechanisms through which a firm 
learns by reflecting upon its existing knowledge. First, I develop a theoretical concept of 
learning by teaching in Chapter 2. Building on the mechanisms of individual tutor learning 
from the education and psychology literature, I propose three core envisioned mechanisms 
related to learning by teaching at the organizational level, which are restoration of lost 
knowledge, reconfiguration of inefficient knowledge, and revamping incomplete 
knowledge.  
Then, I describe in detail the core variables that are used in the empirically tests 
following Chapter 3 to help the readers’ comprehension. Being fully informed of the 
characteristics of- and distinctions between non-performing loans, charge-offs, and loan 
loss provisions from the banking industry is vital to understand the empirical models in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. The first empirical test that is described in Chapter 4 investigates 
the U.S. banking industry to test the impact of learning by teaching on a bank holding 
company’s overall loan quality. Results largely support the proposed hypotheses and 
conclude that relatively superior bank holding companies associate more with a teaching 
role and learn from the teaching experience. The empirical model tests the diffusion of 
learning by teaching by measuring the loan quality improvement in all the parent 
company’s affiliates but excludes the particular bank that acquired the target bank in order 
to tease out any potential synergy effects. In Chapter 5, I explore the learning by teaching 
mechanisms at a particular task-level and focus on the learning of the focal bank that was 
directly involved in the merger and integration. By adopting a forecasting model from the 
Accounting literature, I investigate the patterns of acquisitions and its impact on improving 
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timeliness in loan loss provisioning. Again, results are largely consistent with the 
theoretical arguments that relatively superior banks to the target bank become timelier in 
recognizing loan losses arguably due to a learning by teaching effect.          
 
Expected Contributions  
 This dissertation contributes to the vast learning literature in strategic management 
and organization theory by providing a new theoretical construct that extends our 
understanding of knowledge acquisition and knowledge management. Specifically, I 
propose a learning by teaching mechanism where firms that involve in activities such as 
post-merger integration or consulting and therefore associate with extensive amount of 
training can develop superior knowledge and capabilities as a result of a teaching activity. 
Although learning by teaching is a well-known topic in other areas of social studies and 
has been studied largely in experiments to investigate the effect of teaching on individuals’ 
performance (Katona, 1940; Bargh and Schul, 1980; Benware & Deci, 1984; Fiorella & 
Mayer, 2013; Fiorella & Mayer, 2014), little work has been done on the theoretical 
development and, to the best of my knowledge, this dissertation is the first to study the 
applications of learning by teaching at the organizational level.   
The present dissertation also contributes to the acquisition literature by providing a 
more fine-grained integration type that considers the explorative and exploitative benefits 
when absorbing a new entity. In their seminal work, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) 
develop a framework of integration types that are determined by the need for 
interdependence to create value and the need for autonomy. The authors propose three 
major types of integration: absorption, preservation, and symbiosis. Unlike preservation 
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and symbiosis where learning comes from the acquisition of novel knowledge and 
capability sets, it is quite unclear to how learning occurs in an absorption type of integration. 
Hence, I focus on the absorption integration type where little autonomy is granted and 
therefore major training is involved in order to help the acquired entity to adapt to the 
acquiring firm’s systems and routines. The degree of interdependence of knowledge and 
capabilities between the acquired and acquiring firm that is required to create value plays 
an important role in distinguishing between a two-way transfer and one-way transfer of 
knowledge. In Haspeslagh and Jemison’s work (1991), the interdependency of knowledge 
and capabilities between the two merging entities bears an assumption that the direction of 
knowledge flow is in both directions; the acquiring firm learns from the acquired firm and 
vice versa. However, in many real cases of acquisitions, absorption is chosen as the form 
of integration although there is no interdependence of knowledge or capabilities between 
the merging firms such as in the case where firms acquire for scale expansion reasons. 
Under such circumstances, the direction of knowledge flow is highly likely a one-way 
capability transfer and the learning by teaching mechanism is arguably most salient when 
there is slack managerial capacity not being occupied by absorbing new information. This 
dissertation contributes to the acquisition literature by introducing a learning mechanism 
that triggers an exploitative type of absorptive integration.  
Lastly, this dissertation provides implications to the evolutionary literature through 
a provision of a wider application of dynamic capabilities and absorptive capacity. Firm 
expansion and integration causes much change and disruption to both the focal firm’s 
operations and the external competitive landscape. Therefore, firms that experience any 
type of acquisition and integration are revealed to the necessity of reconfiguring its 
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capability sets in order to conform to the dynamic change (Teece, Pisano, Shuen, 1997; 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003; Helfat, Finkelstein, Mitchell, Peteraf, Singh, 
Teece, and Winter, 2009). While substantial research has explored the antecedents and 
significance of dynamic capabilities, findings in this area of research are limited to the firm 
components and conditions interconnected to the market environments and the 
development of the constituents of dynamic capabilities. Many prominent scholars have 
theorized in prior research on the discrete types of dynamic capabilities such as adaptive, 
absorptive, and innovative capabilities that are developed within the firm in accordance to 
the firm’s environmental change (Teece et al, 1997; Gibson and Brikinshaw, 2004; Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990; Capron et al, 1992; Wang and Ahmed, 2007). However, it is yet to be 
fully unraveled how such different types of dynamic capabilities can interact with one 
another to create greater value in one’s capabilities. This dissertation sheds light on the 
evolutionary nature of knowledge and capabilities during a special situation of post-merger 
integration where a teaching opportunity promotes the intertwined development of 
adaptive, absorptive, and dynamic capabilities that lead to capability updating and 
improvements in the focal firm’s routine and operating processes.  
 
Overview 
 The second chapter of this dissertation discusses on the theoretical components of 
the learning by teaching mechanism and explores the characteristics in knowledge transfer 
that paradoxically teaches the transferrer. In particular, I focus on the recognition of 
forgotten, existing, and potentially new organizational knowledge as well as its 
interrelatedness with the specific learning mechanisms in a teaching environment. In 
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Chapter three, I elaborate on the research context that pin points the opportunities to teach 
in the business world where firms need to invest much effort into post-merger integration 
in order to transfer the focal firm’s existing systems and routines as well as assist improving 
the acquired firm’s performance. Due to the favorable and unique characteristics of the 
financial reports in the banking industry, I use data from the U.S. commercial banking 
industry and focus on loan lending performance prior to and after an inter-firm acquisition 
in order to test the theoretical perspectives on the efficacy of learning by teaching. To 
facilitate understanding of the two empirical studies that follow in Chapter four and five, I 
provide foundational information on different types of loan risk measures that are used to 
construct the core variables in both empirical studies.  
In Chapter four, I examine how performance difference between the acquiring firm 
and the acquired firm plays a critical role as a determinant to the top-down managing 
integration style that is often associated with an extensive amount of teaching at the 
acquiring firm and subsequently influence the acquiring firm’s future performance. The 
uniqueness in this analysis lies on the fact that the acquiring firm’s post-teaching 
performance is measured only among the affiliates that existed prior to the acquisition. 
Followed by testing the main effects of learning by teaching, I also theorize on the 
conditions to where the effect of learning by teaching can be enhanced or suppressed. I test 
the proposed hypotheses using a longitudinal panel data of U.S. commercial banks for the 
sample period between 1998 and 2009. In Chapter five, I take a different approach and 
measure loan lending performance in terms of risk management by adopting an analytic 
model that is widely used in the Accounting field in order to measure a bank’s capability 
in forecasting loan risk. I test the effect of learning by teaching by comparing firms that 
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acquire new units and are forced to teach to a control group that does not involve in 
acquisition activities.  
Finally, Chapter six summarizes the theoretical arguments and the findings from 
the two empirical studies as well as the implications to industry practitioners and 
contribution to research. I then discuss future work that can be developed from this 
dissertation.  
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Chapter 2 
 Conceptual Development of Learning by Teaching 
 
Introduction 
“If, in each hour, a man could learn a single fragment of some branch of knowledge, a single rule 
of some mechanical art, a single pleasing story or proverb (the acquisition of which would require 
no effort), what a vast stock of learning he might lay by. Seneca is therefore right when he says: 
"Life is long, if we know how to use it." It is consequently of importance that we understand the 
art of making the very best use of our lives.” (The great didactic, Comenius, 1649) 
 
 
Over several decades, management scholars have focused on a broad stream of 
research where organizational learning is depicted mainly through the lenses of two 
mechanisms. The first type focuses on the history of a firm and the efforts that involve trial 
and errors during past and current performance (Argote, 1999; Posen and Chen, 2014). 
This type, denoted as experiential learning or learning by doing, entails improvement in a 
firm’s learning curve through the accumulation of decision making experiences and 
advancement in routines. The other type of organizational learning considers developing 
new routines and technology by observing other rivals in the market (Kim and Miner, 2007; 
Denrell, 2003). Such observational learning known as vicarious learning relies on the 
experience of others where one can benefit from cost and time efficiency and low risk. 
While prior work in this domain has yielded much influential insights on the process and 
outcomes of organizational learning and its impact on firm strategies, it is to my knowledge 
that little work has been done on departing from the core mechanisms and discovering new 
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constructs and processes. In this dissertation, I attempt to unveil an additional learning 
mechanism that is activated during the knowledge transfer process between two or more 
entities. To achieve a complete understanding of the full spectrum of organizational 
learning, I propose a theoretical construct called reflective learning where learning benefits 
are generated as a byproduct of transferring knowledge to a different entity. This can be 
easily understood as the process of learning by teaching.   
In his seminal work, Huber (1991) addresses different dimensions and sources of 
organizational learning that typically involve the acquisition of knowledge, the distribution 
of knowledge, information interpretation, and memory of knowledge. Although he 
provides deep insight on how these major constructs provide a foundation to the 
architecture of knowledge and capability development, understanding how firms 
strengthen their current set of knowledge and capabilities and how such processes and 
needs are recognized within the management team remain unclear. In the effort to extend 
our comprehension on the growth of knowledge and capabilities and the fruitfulness of 
knowledge recognition, I offer an organizational behavior that initiates discovering the 
incompleteness and inefficiency in knowledge and capabilities within a firm. I build 
grounds of my arguments upon a couple theoretical antecedents as discussed in the 
following.   
 
Theoretical Antecedents 
Organizational Memory Loss  Organizational knowledge is stored within the firm 
in different forms depending on the characteristic of information. Hard information, in 
other words codified knowledge, is written into documents, scripts, and files while soft 
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information is kept within routines and personnel (Levitt and March, 1988). While an 
extended amount of research in the organizational learning literature stems from the 
assumption of the retainability of cumulative knowledge, many prominent scholars have 
warned that knowledge embedded within an organization can, in fact, be lost when the 
storages of information leave the boundary of the firm either through employee turnover, 
losses in documents, decay in networks, or simply due to the nature of information 
becoming obsolete over time (Levitt and March, 1988; Argote, 1999; Burt, 2002; De Holan 
and Phillips, 2004). Highlighting the different perspectives towards whether knowledge 
acquired through learning persists or decays over time is important to understand the true 
reservoir of knowledge and capabilities of a firm, which ultimately leads to making 
superior strategic choices. The latter group of scholars who argue that an organization, in 
fact, forgets its existing knowledge, concern that the anticipation of future production based 
on the classic learning curve may turn out to be overestimated (Argote, 1999). I attempt to 
address such concerns in this dissertation by introducing a mechanism through which a 
firm can minimize this mismatch by restoring and retrieving its forgotten knowledge. 
Taking to account the perspective that firms can retain or rediscover lost memory will 
provide us with a better understanding in organizational learning and firm knowledge 
management. Adding to the well-developed theory of the decay of knowledge and 
acquisition of new knowledge, I study the renewal of knowledge, which has been 
understudied in the strategic management literature.  
 
Unintentional Learning A reason to why scholars have not paid much attention to the 
value of recognizing one’s own knowledge is because the underlying learning mechanism 
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is arguably less intuitive and hidden behind the more direct benefits. Huber (1991) states 
how learning within an organization is not necessarily conscious or intentional but could 
be rather unintentional and unsystematic. In conventional studies, the development of 
knowledge and capabilities in inter-organizational interactions are anticipated to occur to 
the entity with smaller knowledge stock that receives information from the more 
experienced. Under this perspective, the size of knowledge stock does not necessarily 
imply the absolute size of resource reservoir but rather a relative possession of a particular 
piece of information. For instance, an incumbent whose asset size is three times as larger 
can learn different routines or capabilities from an entrant whose characteristics and 
performance is distant from the incumbent. This is because the knowledge and capabilities 
that the entrant possesses is something that the incumbent does not own. In this regard, the 
entrant has a larger knowledge stock in terms of the unique information that it holds 
compared to the incumbent. Departing from the traditional perspective on knowledge flow, 
this paper focuses on the benefits that the incumbent can unintentionally exploit through 
the interactions with its affiliates despite their larger size of knowledge stock both in 
absolute and relative terms. In particular, I explore the theoretical application in the post-
merger integration context where a large degree of ‘teaching’ arguably takes place. 
Because post-merger integration is a complex and intertwined activity of planning and 
coordinating between the acquirer and target, it is easy to overlook the unintentional 
learning and discovery benefits granted to the incumbent (March and Olsen, 1979; 
Levinthal and March, 1981; Huber, 1991). Later in this chapter, I will address the often 
obscured and less obvious learning mechanisms through which teaching can bring to the 
acquiring firm during an integration stage.    
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Double-Loop Learning In his work, Argyris (1977) develops a theoretical 
framework on the general types and processes of organizational learning. The conventional 
learning mechanisms in organizational studies fall through a single-loop learning type as 
firms enter the market with their initial strategy and receive feedback from other actors in 
the market. Depending on whether the feedback is positive or negative, firms decide to 
continue operating in the market with its current strategy or update its processes and 
strategy to receive better evaluation. In essence, single-loop learning depicts the repetition 
of trial and error process based on the feedback that firms receive from the real world. 
However, there is a critical limitation to single-loop learning as often the mental maps or 
assumptions of a manager at a focal firm may have errors and it is difficult to understand 
how managers would adjust their initial assumptions that lead to a particular firm strategy. 
Argyris discusses the additional loop between receiving market feedback and adjusting 
one’s mental model that is involved in a decision-making process, which he calls double-
loop learning. To help the reader’s conceptual development of double-loop learning, he 
also suggests the conditions and inhibiting factors to this particular learning mechanism. It 
is argued that double-loop learning is generally encouraged by a crisis precipitated by an 
event or a revolution within the firm. However, even though the need for double-loop 
learning is recognized due to a shock, the likelihood of successful double-loop learning is 
low due to the rigidity in managers, social norms that prevent employees to raise challenges, 
and counterproductive group dynamics (Argyris, 1977). This dissertation advances the 
work of Argyris (1977) on the enhancers of double-loop learning and explores a possible 
mechanism that facilitates managers to voluntarily revisit their foundational assumptions 
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without confronting the aforementioned detrimental shocks that trigger double-loop 
learning. While double-loop learning is anticipated to stem from feedback on poor 
performance, I propose that teaching can promote double-loop learning for good 
performers even without a performance drop.  To put it colloquially, a great teacher can 
still learn of his or her mistakes, if any, through a teaching act.  
  
Learning by Teaching in Social Science at the Individual Level  
In Social Science where individuals are the unit of analysis, the efficacy of learning 
by teaching has been widely investigated both theoretically and empirically. For example, 
tutor learning is a well-studied topic in the Education and Psychology research where a 
teaching activity is proven to reinforce the teacher’s knowledge (Galbraith and 
Winterbottom, 2011; Hoogerheide, Deijkers, Loyens, Heijltkes, and van Gog, 2016; Allen 
& Feldman, 1973; Cohen, Kulik, & Kulik, 1982; Bargh & Schul, 1980; Roscoe & Chi, 
2007; Fiorella & Mayer, 2014). Teaching is perceived as a process that is not limited to 
merely delivering knowledge but also as a process of developing knowledge through self-
monitoring of comprehension, integration of new and old knowledge, and elaboration and 
construction of knowledge (Roscoe & Chi, 2007). Because effective teaching is associated 
with various tactics that are cognitively demanding such as explaining, questioning, 
assessing, and providing feedback (McArthur, Stasz, & Zmuidzinas, 1990; Shah, Evens, 
Michael, & Rovick, 2002; Roscoe & Chi, 2007), the entire process from preparation to 
explaining and to answering questions account for the cognitive development of the teacher. 
It is argues that the act of teaching allows the teacher to generate inferences while reflecting 
15 
 
upon his or her own knowledge, integrate ideas across different domains, and repair 
possible errors (Allen & Feldman, 1976; Bargh & Schul, 1980; Roscoe & Chi, 2007).  
Bargh and Schul (1980) discuss the nature of the teacher’s gain by decomposing 
the learning into content-specific and general learning. A teaching activity provides 
opportunities for the teacher to generate stronger connections and inferences related to the 
subject matter by organizing and elaborating the contents to be transferred. Furthermore, a 
teaching activity would facilitate the learning of related materials that are not necessarily 
part of the content being transferred. Based on this decomposition of learning effects, 
different teaching benefits are granted to the teacher at different stages of the teaching 
process. A large body of research focuses on the preparation stage of the teaching activity, 
which happens prior to interacting with the knowledge recipient (Katona, 1940; Benware 
& Deci, 1984; Fiorella & Mayer, 2013; Fiorella & Mayer, 2014). Scholars in this field 
argue that the amount of time the teacher is exposed to the subject matter during the 
preparation stage is greater to those who do not involve in any teaching activity. Studies 
have shown that the considerable amount of time and effort devoted to studying the 
teaching materials contributes to the learning of the teacher through a retrieval process of 
knowledge (Agarwal, Karpicke, Kang, Roediger, & McDermott, 2008; Butler & Roediger, 
2007; Chan & McDermott, 2007; Kang, McDermott, & Roediger, 2007; McDaniel, 
Howard, & Einstein, 2009; Karpicke & Grimaldi, 2012; Koh, Lee, & Lim, 2018).  
The quantitative difference in time not only implies the time teachers spend on 
studying the content but also the time teachers spend on organizing the cognitive structure 
of the knowledge they already know (Katona, 1940; Bransford, Nitsch, & Franks, 1977; 
Bargh & Schul, 1980). An organization of cognitive structure helps the teacher understand 
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the relationships between the contents rather than merely understanding the meaning of 
individual content (Katona, 1940). Mastery of the relationship between contents is 
especially important when preparing to teach as it provides a mental map that draws 
connections between foundational information and the subject matter to be transferred that 
would further facilitate the transfer of knowledge when interacting with the knowledge 
recipient. Content-specific learning also occurs during the explanation stage of teaching. 
The verbalization of knowledge stimulates long-term memory and the positive response 
from the knowledge recipient provides a reinforcement effect to the teacher (Rickards, 
1971; Bargh & Schul, 1980). A recent study by Hoogerheide, Deijkers, Loyens, Heijltkes, 
and van Gog (2016) investigates the effect of verbally sharing knowledge with an audience 
on the teacher’s learning. The authors conducted an experimental study where they offered 
participants an opportunity to 1) restudy the teaching materials, 2) explain the teaching 
material in writing, and 3) explain the teaching material via video. Findings suggest that 
the social presence and pressure that their actions may directly affect others have enhanced 
the cognitive learning aspect of the teacher. While verbally explaining the teaching material, 
teachers constantly monitor whether the students comprehend the contents well, which is 
a signal to the quality of teaching. Research suggests that this monitoring process leads to 
greater arousal levels of the teacher that fosters cognitive processes such as memory, 
attention, and alertness (Arnsten, 2009; Diamond, Campbell, Park, Halonen, & Zoladz, 
2007; Roozendaal, 2002; Sauro, Jorgensen, & Pedlow, 2003; Hoogerheide, Deijkers, 
Loyens, Heijltkes, and van Gog, 2016 ).  
Also, elaborating contents in verbal form requires the teacher to think beyond the 
subject matter and subsequently helps make connections between new information and 
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existing knowledge of the teacher (Chi, 2000; Fiorella & Mayer, 2014). Prior studies 
suggest that generating quality explanations for others promote deep learning compared to 
a simple knowledge telling activity due to the knowledge building process described as the 
following (Fiorella & Mayer, 2014). Verbal representation of knowledge provides structure 
to tacit knowledge of the teacher. During the preparation stage of teaching, the teacher 
codifies knowledge into the form of manuals, blueprints, and guidelines. While the purpose 
of codification of knowledge is to facilitate the diffusion of knowledge to students, the time 
and effort put towards creating the teaching materials contributes to the knowledge 
building of the teacher in terms of structuring the relationships between information (Singh 
& Zollo, 1998). By articulating causal relationships between distinct pieces of knowledge, 
the teacher increases the propensity to discover new solutions and enhances his or her own 
cognitive growth.  
Finally, distinct from the prior stages in teaching, answering to questions and 
responding to feedback offers the teacher to actively interact with the knowledge recipient 
and realize the weaker areas of the teacher’s explanation (Bargh & Schul, 1980). As the 
teachers are required to answer to the questions and repeat the explanation, teachers are 
enforced to make changes to their initial way of organizing and integrating knowledge. In 
other cases, the questions asked are not necessarily within the capability of the teacher to 
answer. The different perspectives of the knowledge recipient stimulate the teacher to 
rebuild relationships among the contents and even discover new or different ones.  
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Connecting Individual and Organizational Learning: Group Level Learning  
Before I discuss further in this dissertation the efficacy of learning by teaching at 
the organizational level, I will address in this section the theory that bridges individual 
learning mechanisms and organizational learning through group or team base learning. 
Later in this dissertation, I discuss the diffusion of learning by teaching and how the 
application of learning from the parent level flows to the affiliate level. In order to 
understand the diffusion process, it is critical to understand the isomorphism of learning 
from different level units such as the organization, subordinates, groups, and individuals. 
An organization is easily understood as a structured hierarchy of individuals and groups, 
which are a collective of individuals that again form the organization. Understanding the 
nested hierarchy of individuals to groups, and to organization will help us understand the 
application of individual learning mechanisms to the organizational level. Analyzing 
learning at the group level is especially important for the learning by teaching mechanism 
that is of our interest in this dissertation. Teaching involves at least two entities, the teacher 
and the student. In organizations, often times, the teacher is a group of individuals who are 
qualified and authorized to provide services to transfer knowledge to others. For example, 
when organizations need to train their new hires, they assign Human Resources department 
to take charge of transferring firm specific knowledge, routines, processes, or systems. 
Individuals from the Human Resources department would come together and discuss the 
training materials, select training methods, and share feedback from each training session. 
Moreover, in order to bring the new hire up to speed in terms of task specific knowledge, 
subject managers will work together with the Human Resources department to build new 
training materials and develop old materials that may be out of date. Many times, the 
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subject managers are the actual knowledge transferer and any learning that comes from the 
training program would be shared with the Human Resources department or Professional 
Development department for future training references.  
Interactions between such multiple individuals from multiple groups facilitate and 
enhance the learning that is granted to the teacher group as a whole. Through this group 
level interaction, not only does the teacher help improve the trainee’s performance and 
knowledge but also involves in developing the knowledge base of the teacher group. 
During this process, the teacher group engages in asking questions, providing feedback, 
reflecting, and making changes. The collective effort of individuals from the teacher group 
who share different capabilities and knowledge allows the team to adjust quickly to any 
changes (London & Sessa, 2006).  Lewis (2003) explains how “the cooperative division of 
labor for learning, remembering, and communicating relevant team knowledge” can 
enhance group productivity.  
  Groups learn through similar mechanisms as individuals. In their work, London 
and Sessa (2006) provides us with the comparison of individual learning, group learning, 
and organizational learning and how learning at different levels resemble each other while 
exhibiting differences in terms of specific mechanisms. Learning across these multi-levels 
is analyzed based on the different individual types of learning - adaptive learning, 
generative learning, and transformative learning.  
Adaptive learning is commonly understood as problemistic search behavior in 
organizational studies. Change in environmental conditions act as a trigger for systems to 
manage and improve their performance by adjusting inputs or processes. Individuals 
recognize the relationship between a stimulus and their behavior and the impact on 
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outcome. By adapting to this relationship, individuals solve problems, collaborate, and 
make decisions (Kelly, Burton, Kato, & Akamatsu, 2001; Mathew et al., 1989). Groups, 
on the other hand, follow the same process of adaptation but with greater efficiency and 
speed through the division of labor and a broader skill set. At the organizational level, 
adaptation occurs when groups start communicating within and across different groups and 
the behavioral change at the group level affects the change in strategies, rules, routines, 
structure, and systems of the organization. The activity of teaching triggers the group of 
individual teachers to adapt to new environmental changes. Materials that are used in the 
curriculum of teaching may not be up to date or even may be obsolete. It is to the teachers’ 
best interest to make changes to the teaching materials and reflect the current requirements 
for success in order to improve the students’ performance, especially when the students’ 
performance is highly correlated with the teachers’ performance. Because teachers are 
members of different functional groups within the organization, adaptation efforts made 
during the course of training reflects back to each functional group’s operations and 
revamps the knowledge base of the organization.        
Generative learning refers to the process where individuals apply new skills to their 
performance in order to be prepared for future demands (Laszlo, 1996). Enhanced goal 
accomplishment and internal mental process of insight motivate individuals to engage in 
generative learning. The acquisition of new knowledge at the individual level is goal-driven 
and self-determined in order to grow within their career path and increase performance 
level. Such motivations and incentives are similar for groups but differ in terms of the 
means to achieving generative learning. Unlike individuals, groups can hire new 
individuals who possess certain knowledge or capabilities or reassign roles or 
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responsibilities. Also, intentions to learn and improve do not have to be based on a common 
agreement for groups. A motivated single individual can apply his or her learning to the 
group’s operations and educate their colleagues. At the organizational level, top managers’ 
interest in growing the organization or preparing for unanticipated environmental change 
can trigger generative learning. Managers can decide to restructure the organization, 
change systems and culture, or even acquire new units (London & Sessa, 2006). Generative 
learning from a teaching activity may occur at the individual level where teachers intend 
to improve their teaching skills prior to teaching. This may occur due to the fact that 
teachers aim for better teaching evaluations or they do not want to embarrass themselves 
in front of the group of students. It is common knowledge that MBA students are much 
more challenging than undergraduates to professors in Business and the professors tend to 
spend more time preparing for MBA classes. In order to avoid confrontation and criticisms 
from students, teachers spend time revisiting their current teaching materials and methods 
to seek for opportunities to improve. At an organization, teaching or training is a collective 
effort of a group of teachers from functional groups and Human Resource departments. An 
individual’s effort may not suffice for the goal of improving the teaching quality as a group. 
The motivated teacher will share his or her individual generative learnings and motivations 
to engage other teachers to the learning process for better performance. Again, the learning 
diffuses throughout the organization as the teachers bring back the newly developed 
knowledge into their own functional groups. 
Lastly, transformative learning results in a drastic change within the focal unit’s 
behavior and outcome (Mezirow, 1991, 1994; London & Sessa, 2006). Often through 
interactions with others, individuals identify the need to challenge their mental models and 
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assumptions and develop fresh ideas or new methods. Such transformative learning can be 
enhanced in groups where members of the group constantly share insights and challenge 
each other through feedback channels. Because of the coopetitive relationship between 
group members, once the initial breakthrough occurs, the learning and transformation 
evolves more systematically than that of an individual as long as the incentives are aligned 
among group members. Individual and group level transformative learning may occur as a 
top-down enforcement in an organization. For instance, if the CEO of a firm sets new goals 
or visions and expects a fundamental change in operations, culture, or structure of the firm, 
functional departments are required to transform their current routines and systems. Similar 
to adaptive learning and generative learning, individuals, groups, and organizations may 
experience transformative learning during the course of teaching another entity. As time 
progresses, the preferences and characteristics of students as well as the surrounding 
environment change by generation. The teacher confronts the need to adjust the teaching 
methods or even materials in order to meet new and different demands. For example, a 
business professor may find herself having to take out particular case studies from the 
curriculum because the new generation of students became less familiar with old firms. 
The professor may even have to adopt new technology to facilitate learning and entirely 
change the method of teaching. At the organizational level, however, transformational 
learning occurs less often than individuals due to organizational inertia (Levitt and March, 
1988; Kim, Dobrev, and Solari, 2003; Dobrev, Kim, and Carroll, 2003). As organizations 
accrues experience in a particular type of form, they become less likely to change in future 
transformations (Dobrev, Kim, and Carroll, 2003). Managers are favorable to current 
routines rather than having disruption unless there is pressure from a strong force or a shock 
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that underlines the need for change. Although not on a day-to-day basis, organizations are 
yet exposed to such shocks such as mergers and acquisitions, expansion, or change in 
management. In the later section of this dissertation, I discuss how training the acquired 
firm’s employees can trigger transformative learning at the acquiring firm.       
 Nowadays, the diffusion of learning has become much more efficient through the 
advent of communication technologies that enable individuals and organizations to share 
information more frequently and faster despite any geographical distance between the 
entities (London & Sessa, 2006). Learning benefits harvested at a single unit level can now 
travel more efficiently and effectively across multi-levels. Organizational learning by 
teaching can occur as individual teachers transfer learning to one another and bring back 
the improved contents to their original functional group. These functional groups share 
information and enhance operations that affect a higher level institutionalization of strategy, 
structure, culture, and systems of the organization and improve the performance of the 
organization as a whole (London & Sessa, 2006).  
With a better understanding of how individual learning evolves into organizational 
learning, I apply the theoretical perspectives of individual learning by teaching to 
organizations by linking the learning by teaching mechanisms to organizational knowledge 
pathology in the following sections.    
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Envisioned Mechanisms at the Organizational Level 
Revisiting Knowledge  As addressed at the beginning of this chapter, the stock of 
organizational knowledge is not necessarily cumulative as it can be lost due to various 
causes that include employee turnover, document losses, decay in networks, or technology 
becoming obsolete (Levitt and March, 1988; Argote, 1999; Burt, 2002; De Holan and 
Phillips, 2004). As much as this trait of knowledge negatively affects the full development 
of a firm’s knowledge and capability, it also provides, paradoxically, areas to learn and 
improve through the recovery of lost information.  
In the organizational context, training programs require a great deal of preparation 
in terms of time, money, and effort prior to transferring any knowledge or capabilities. 
During the preparation stage of a training program, the teaching entity may need to collect 
information that provides a backdrop or foundational knowledge of the context to be 
transferred in order to facilitate the knowledge receiving entity’s understanding on the 
material being taught. Providing foundational knowledge may require the teaching entity 
to revisit its current set of knowledge and capabilities. Similar to the teaching preparation 
processes at the individual level, organizations are encouraged to integrate current 
knowledge with prior knowledge and thoughtfully lay out the relationships between 
discrete fragments of knowledge when creating backdrop materials in a training program.  
In the course of clarifying relationships between knowledge, firms may realize that a 
potentially valuable part of knowledge had been lost from their database or neglected over 
time. Once the recognition of lost knowledge takes place, managers of a firm are assumed 
to act at their best to restore the missing parts given that the lost knowledge is considered 
valuable. Unlike newly acquired knowledge, restored knowledge lasts over a longer period 
25 
 
due to the additional accumulation of effort and additional time being exposed to the 
knowledge being recovered (Katona, 1940; Bransford, Nitsch, & Franks, 1977; Bargh & 
Schul, 1980). Also, the focal firm’s absorptive capabilities that have been developed over 
time are highly likely to be superior than those of the focal firm in its past. Greater 
absorptive capabilities allow the focal firm to recover lost knowledge more efficiently than 
what it would take if it were the first time to acquire the particular knowledge (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990). Because the existence of prior knowledge provides building blocks to the 
subsequent development of absorptive capabilities, the restoration of prior knowledge 
arguably offers the firm of a broader set of knowledge and capabilities that can further 
improve the firm’s absorptive capabilities in subsequent periods.  
Inherent in training programs are stages of tasks, of which firm managers can 
clearly identify such as planning milestones, preparing materials, modifying contents, and 
transmitting knowledge, while others may be less intuitive resulting in failure of 
recognizing the value of such tasks. The recognition of memory loss falls in this category 
of relatively less intuitive tasks while it is, in fact, embedded in various practices of the 
firm. Possible circumstances where lost memory can be recognized include 1) crisis events 
where negative performance feedback or problematic systems induce the need for revision 
of current routines or 2) training programs derived for the purpose of transferring 
knowledge to another entity. This dissertation focuses on the latter.    
 
Reconfiguring Knowledge Procedures and knowledge become obsolete or old 
fashioned over time. Some managers acknowledge this issue and update their processes 
and measures while others may choose to preserve the inferiority. This widely known 
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managerial rigidity, denoted as the competency trap (Levitt and March, 1988), describes 
the phenomenon where managers continue to pursue certain routines that are not 
necessarily the optimal choice because the recent and frequent usage makes them favorable 
(Levitt and March, 1988; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The tendency and momentum of 
using inefficient procedures can be discontinued when managers are provided with 
motivations or incentives to make corrections. This dissertation discusses the motivations 
to modify inefficiencies in the perspective of firm managers who lead a post-merger 
integration and are responsible for the preparation and execution of knowledge transfer.  
If there are any incorrect or outdated information or any inefficiency in the process 
of transmitting knowledge, managers at the acquiring firm would likely notice the error in 
the preparation stage prior to communicating the focal knowledge with the acquired firm. 
Because of the possibility of employees at the acquired firm recognizing the error or 
inefficiency, managers at the acquiring firm are now endowed with incentive to preempt 
the detection by modifying any imperfections a priori. Such preemptive strikes involve a 
re-examination of the current capability set and an adjustment of procedures to resolve for 
any systematic rigidity.  
In addition to making corrections, acquiring firms are often required to codify 
existing procedures, measurements, and rules into documents to transfer the knowledge to 
the acquired entity in post-merger integration. For instance, because tacit knowledge is 
stored in intangible forms or because knowledge may be complex and intertwined, accurate 
comprehension on the focal context may be difficult for the knowledge recipient. While 
the managers of the acquiring firm are motivated to effectively complete the knowledge 
transfer, they are incentivized to transform the focal knowledge to its greatest efficiency 
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and simplicity to make it easier for the recipient to understand. Empowered with the 
motivation and incentive to evaluate and revise current practices and mental models, 
managers are likely to recognize inefficiencies and reconfigure existing procedures and 
even create more superior and efficient ones.  
 
Revamping Knowledge During an integration process, managers at the acquiring 
firm need sufficient comprehension of the position and status of the acquired entity within 
the competitive landscape and the requirements that apply to the acquired entity by the 
current market environments. This thorough understanding designs the development path 
of firms and steers management to i) strategically select which knowledge and capabilities 
should be transferred, ii) effectively execute the knowledge transfer in a customized 
manner to the specific relationship between the acquiring firm and acquired firm, and iii) 
improve the integrated firm’s performance if necessary. The frequent and in-depth 
interactions between the acquiring firm and the acquired firm involves a great extent of 
coordination and reciprocal feedback that allows the acquiring firm to collect a vast amount 
of information, which is necessary for a successful integration and subsequently generating 
positive returns. Not only do managers acquire firm specific information, but through 
thorough due diligence and intense collaboration, managers also encounter market related 
information such as conditions that are required by the competitive market that applies 
specifically to the acquired firm who may have different organizational characteristics 
compared to the acquiring firm.  
In firm acquisitions, it is crucial for the acquiring firm to understand the 
development trajectory of the acquired firm regardless of whether the acquired firm is at 
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its full maturity or at its infancy. Constant feedback loops and coordination between the 
acquiring and acquired firm naturally offers the acquiring firm with a better idea of the 
competitive landscape. As the acquiring firm needs to thoughtfully lay out guidance in 
order to encourage successful performance for the integrated firm, such motivations 
stimulate an expansion of knowledge search for the acquiring firm. With no initial purpose 
of gathering knowledge about the market environment at the point of acquisition, the 
acquiring firm unintentionally learns about the challenges that the acquired firm faces 
through frequent feedback loops and communication during the training process. 
Now that the integrated two entities together have more resources and capabilities, 
collaboration between the two units can enable finding solutions to challenges that either 
firm is facing at a greater efficiency. What is interesting is that the cultivation of a better 
understanding of the full spectrum of current market requirements, from those that the 
acquiring firm faces to those that the acquired firm faces, becomes useful for the acquiring 
firm to resolve issues that itself confronts in future operations.  
Recognition and development of the missing knowledge pieces within the acquiring 
firm is arguably facilitated through training programs and revamping knowledge and 
capabilities is especially useful when a firm is embedded in a dynamic environment 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Figure 1 summarizes the three pathology of knowledge and 
the related mechanisms of learning by teaching that associates with each characteristic. 
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Learning by Doing vs Learning by Teaching  
From the restoration of the parent firm’s lost memory to reconfiguring existing 
practices and to revamping the parent firm’s knowledge base, this dissertation suggests 
potential learning benefits that may be offered to the acquiring firm through extensive 
preparation and consistent interactions with its newly acquired affiliates. It yet remains 
unclear how the learning by teaching process distinctly distinguishes itself from the 
traditional learning by doing mechanism.  
Research on learning by doing builds upon the premise of the acquisition of 
knowledge related to improving a focal activity. To gain knowledge of a particular task, a 
firm needs direct or indirect experience on the focal task and accumulate related knowledge 
and capabilities (Singh and Zollo, 1998). The assumption behind the traditional learning 
by doing mechanism is that knowledge, over time, is permanently stored within the firm 
boundaries and managers make rational decisions based on existing knowledge. In reality, 
however, knowledge not necessarily stays within the firm and rationally bounded managers 
may not have a thorough and precise understanding of gaps and errors in their current 
knowledge set. In this dissertation, I propose how learning by teaching, as a distinct 
mechanism, plays a role of a supplemental process that solves for such issues.   
To help understanding the core differences in learning by teaching versus learning 
by doing, I decompose learning into two components: content and action. Prior research 
on learning by doing has interchangeably used these two discrete components to describe 
the underlying forces and goals of organizational learning. While learning by teaching 
shares some basic characteristics with the learning by doing mechanisms, which includes 
reconfiguration of resources and expansion of search opportunities, unlike learning by 
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doing where the accumulation of action provides development of knowledge related to the 
focal action, the suggested framework of learning by teaching focuses on the contents of 
knowledge that are distant to but derived as a byproduct of the focal action, which is 
teaching. I attempt to disentangle the two mechanisms by its unique characteristics 
addressed below.  
First, the initial driver of the two learning mechanisms differ as the traditional 
learning by doing is a goal driven process whereas learning by teaching is unintentional 
byproduct learning. From the perspective of the traditional learning by doing approach, the 
benefits that the actor seeks for relates to the improved efficiency in the focal act, in which 
our case is teaching. Scholars who adopt this viewpoint would expect the hours of 
preparation to decrease or the use of teaching methods advance as the teacher accumulates 
experience. From the perspective of learning by teaching, however, the actor’s learning 
comes from the content development and change in future behaviors related to the 
knowledge being transferred not the actual act of transferring knowledge. In other words, 
the learning outcomes between the two mechanisms differ where learning by doing 
provides novel inferences related to the focal act while learning by teaching provides new 
connections and structure to the content being transferred rather than improvement in the 
focal act. When assessing learning from a teaching act, the learning by doing framework 
would focus on the improvement in teaching skills rather than the actions that are being 
taught. Hence, I conclude that the upfront awareness of the learning benefits from learning 
by doing is high and the benefits are action driven improvements while the awareness of 
learning from the mechanism of learning by teaching is low and the benefits are rather 
content driven.    
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Second, the two mechanisms differ in terms of the nature of the learning process. 
The acquisition of new knowledge in learning by doing is considered as an unconscious 
act of picking up tacit knowledge as one performs a focal activity. Learning by teaching, 
on the other hand, focuses on deliberately restructuring and organizing existing thoughts. 
I do not argue that learning by teaching does not entail unconscious learning as not 
everything is planned ahead when one engages in a teaching activity nor vice versa. The 
core learning benefits from teaching, however, are derived from codifying knowledge and 
organizing one’s comprehension on the focal knowledge to be transferred. Therefore, I 
argue that the degree of consciousness in the process of learning is greater in learning by 
teaching than learning by doing.  
Lastly, I distinguish the two learning types by the individual mechanisms of 
learning. Learning by doing focuses on acquiring fresh perspectives and efficient 
approaches related to increasing the performance of the focal task. Learning by teaching, 
on the other hand, provides knowledge on the overall health status of the focal actor’s 
existing knowledge base. Teaching in a corporate context triggers an opportunity to 
examine the current knowledge and capabilities of the firm by recognizing the need to 
recover lost knowledge, diagnosing errors or inefficiencies in current knowledge, or 
identifying gaps between fragments of current knowledge. In essence, learning by teaching 
focuses on the evolution in modules and development in recognizing one’s own knowledge 
through revisiting, reconfiguring, and revamping knowledge during the course of 
effectively transferring knowledge to another entity. Table 1 provides summary of the 
distinctions between learning by doing and learning by teaching.  
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Learning by teaching finds its uniqueness in terms of two different processes. First, 
learning by teaching engages in a psychological process where the teacher feels pressure 
and urgency to ‘learn’ what he or she already knows in order to make it readily transferrable 
to the student. Because there is social pressure towards the teacher that he or she should 
understand the content being taught better than the student, the teacher is motivated to 
revisit his or her current knowledge base and thoroughly understand the content. There is 
also an urgency of learning. It is logical for the teacher to transfer up-to-date knowledge 
on superior methods that would lead to the improved performance rather than old fashioned 
inefficient processes. Therefore, the teacher would upgrade his or her knowledge to meet 
the most superior and up-to-date standards prior to teaching. There is, however, an initial 
hurdle of overcoming the foreignness of new knowledge when the teacher intends to 
upgrade their knowledge. In the organizational studies, this tendency of sticking with old 
processes is referred to as competency traps. The urgency to teach enforces the teacher to 
learn and overcome these competency traps. Let’s take the example of using an excel 
program on the computer when managing data. Although one may be aware of the 
existence of running a macro function, because it takes time and effort to learn the new 
method, one may stick with manually adjusting and entering data. When the person is 
demanded to teach how to use excel and manage data, however, one would not suggest the 
inefficient way but rather learn how to use macro and transfer to the student the superior 
method instead.    
Second, learning by teaching finds its novelty in the fact that teaching involves an 
interactive process between two or more entities. The interaction with students while 
transferring knowledge exposes the teacher to new directions of thought processes as well 
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as unrecognized gaps in the teacher’s knowledge base. This interactive process contributes 
to the enhancement in the teacher’s knowledge and changes the behavior of the teacher as 
much as it impacts the behavior of the students.    
  
In the next chapters, to test my theoretical arguments, I use an extensive panel data 
set from the U.S. banking industry and exploit a unique event, namely the 2007 - 2009 
financial crisis, as it provides a natural setting where the Basel Accord promotes a superior 
provisioning method, which firms with experience in a teaching opportunity would have 
arguably adopted prior to the financial crisis through learning by teaching. The third 
chapter leads the two empirical studies by providing foundational information on the 
research context.  
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Chapter 3 
Research Context – The U.S. Commercial Banking Industry 
Teaching in Business 
In firm acquisitions, integration processes require an extensive amount of planning, 
preparation, explaining, and coordination to fully support the newly acquired unit to adjust 
to and follow the rules, systems, and routines of the acquirer. The acquiring firm conducts 
a due diligence on the prospective target firm prior to the acquisition, and once the 
acquisition decision is made the firm forms a special team of managers to prepare and 
execute the integration. The following comment from an interview with a bank manager at 
an acquiring firm after an acquisition describes the integration process and its general 
timeline.  
 
 “…teams are assigned for the integration process and manuals are created. They 
(the firm) make changes each time (an acquisition occurs). It was a three-months 
intense training program and subject experts, including myself, were assigned to 
coordinate with the new guys to get things done. Although it was a three months 
training program it usually takes at least 18 months to truly get the system 
embedded… We definitely look back into the materials from the past and we 
definitely learn from ourselves...”  
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In general, acquiring firms create more or less than 50 new programs for the 
purpose of training newly acquired units. For example, the 2009 Corporate Responsibility 
Report of TD Bank who acquired Commerce Bancorp in 2008 reveals as follows the extent 
of financial and physical efforts invested into a single integration process.  
• A set of Guiding Principles and Integration Objectives guided our governance and 
decision making throughout the entire process. 
• Human Resources (HR) teams worked to ensure that employees were supported 
through the transition and kept informed of HR initiatives impacting them. 
• During the 18-month period of integration we: 
– integrated our brand, culture and business model at 1,100 stores, and 
successfully completed data conversion; 
– trained 15,035 employees; 
– logged a total of 385,000 hours of training; and 
– developed 88 new training programs to support integration. 
Although teaching does not immediately sound like a viable activity in the business 
context, in fact, teaching is one of the activities that the firm heavily invests up to $100 
billion a year (Bersin & Associates, figure for global spending, 2008), especially when 
training during, although not limited to, post-merger integrations.  
In an article from McKinsey & Company’s quarterly publication in 2010, Smet, 
Mcgurk, and Schwartz (2010) describes the stages and general processes of a firm’s 
training program. Prior to the actual training, the firm needs to ensure that they have the 
right personnel, which include relevant subject leaders and HR staff, on board for the 
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program to be successful. Here is an example directly quoted from the McKinsey Quarterly 
(2010) that describes this process: 
 
“..One industrial company noted a need to upgrade the skills of its marketing department. 
The HR staff launched a well-conceived program—based on a clear definition of the new 
skills good marketers must have—that included a curriculum developed by a leading 
university. In parallel, the company hired several employees who had the skills it was 
trying to foster and who would, presumably, help their colleagues develop them.” 
 
The authors discuss how the engagement level of subject leaders impacts the overall 
effectiveness of firm training. Companies realize greater improvements in operations when 
relevant leaders participate in designing, delivering, and reflecting from the training materials. 
Reflecting upon the leaders’ own mindset and bringing the learning back to their daily operating 
environment after the training has been completed has been identified as the core instrument of 
training (Smet, Mcgurk, & Schwartz, 2010). Yet, many firms do not acknowledge the benefits 
that stem from the leaders’ reflective learning and many training programs fail when leaders 
overlook the importance of reflecting upon current knowledge and reconfiguring processes that 
leads to improvement in firm performance.  
The next step in teaching is delivering the focal knowledge. Depending on the context 
and purpose of training, either HR staff or subject leaders engage in the actual teaching activity. 
In many firms, the impact of teaching is generally measured over the delivering act. In other 
words, participants or students provide feedback based on merely the delivery process of 
knowledge on whether they liked the program or not (Smet, Mcgurk, & Schwartz, 2010). This 
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implies that there is a probability that incentives for HR departments or subject leaders are 
not aligned with the organization’s goal to ultimately improve performance. This paper, 
therefore, provides practitioners implications that consciously looking after reflective 
learning may lead to greater improvements in operations and performance by revisiting 
current processes, standards, and systems and making adjustments to any inferior routines 
or reducing inefficiencies.  
The last step implied in the McKinsey Quarterly (2010) is the bringing-back-
knowledge stage. Prior to and during the knowledge delivery, leaders from functional areas 
get together with the HR department to create and develop training materials. As the 
environment of which the firm is part of dynamically changes over time, companies face 
the need to update capabilities. To fulfill this need, firms adopt and transfer new or 
advanced skills to their employees. Functional or area leaders are presumed to have insight 
over unforeseen fluctuations or transformations in the industry or macro-environment. 
These leaders bring their expertise to the table when preparing for a training session. 
During this process, leaders and HR managers jointly or independently discover areas for 
improvement in the knowledge to be taught. Based on the expertise of these individuals 
who participate in the preparation stage of training, not only do these functional leaders 
make corrections to outdated or inefficient information but also look out for means to 
further develop the knowledge of interest. This particular thought process of the functional 
leaders is where reflective learning takes place. As in Argyris’ (1977) work on double-loop 
learning, managers adjust their mental representations and assumptions to current models 
that lead to the development of further knowledge. Once reflective learning is realized 
within the group of teachers at the training program, it is natural for these teachers to return 
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to their original functional groups with new knowledge that has been developed over the 
course of training and transfer the advanced information to other members of the group 
unless there are other incentives to behave otherwise.  
In the two empirical studies that follow this chapter, I study the effect of teaching 
on improvements in loan risk management. In order to help the understanding of the readers 
of the empirical studies in Chapter 4 and 5, I explain a couple measures widely used in the 
banking industry.  
 
Banking industry and financial statements 
Federal law enforces all commercial banks including both private and public 
institutions to file their financial information to the Federal Reserve and FDIC on a 
quarterly basis. This report, called the Y-9C or Call Report, discloses the bank’s financial 
conditions, risk profiles, and detailed breakdowns on income allowing for internal and 
external parties to monitor the institution’s performance and stability. Requirements to the 
call report differ by size of the bank, nature of activities, or the possession of foreign 
affiliations (FDIC, 2016). The vast amount of information, standardized requirements, and 
enforced reporting system allow researchers to use call reports as a major source of readily 
available statistical data.  
Each institution that is insured by the FDIC is assigned a unique certificate number, 
which is used as a bank identifier in call reports. Another useful bank identifier in public 
financial reports is the rssdid that is assigned by the Federal Reserve. With these two 
identifiers, researchers can integrate different sets of financial reports and match 
information for a broader approach in research. The main variables used in this dissertation 
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are collected from three different financial statements of commercial banks. Spanning the 
information provided in the FDIC call reports, I combine loan portfolio breakdowns from 
the institution’s balance sheet where loans are typically specified into four categories; real 
estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, individual loans, and agricultural loans. 
Finally, I merge the income statement data to collect accounting measures to loan risks. 
The importance of loan data and the advantage of the extended data set will be further 
addressed in the following sub sections.  
 
Accounting measures of loan risk 
Loan income comprises the biggest component in bank assets, hence, considered 
the most important and fundamental economic activity of a bank. Because default in loans 
directly affect the stock value of a bank, troublesome loans are of particular interest to 
investors, stakeholders, and financial analysts. Also, due to the fact that loan lending 
activities involve higher level oversight and estimates of bank managers, it is crucial in the 
banking industry to develop accounting tools that enable internal and external parties to 
monitor and manage default risk by providing direct and indirect measures to loan losses. 
In this section, I address three distinct accounting measures that capture default risk 
associated to loans where some measures are based on realized values and others depend 
on forecasted numbers. 
Non-performing loans  When the bank does not receive either interest or principal 
payment for more than 90 days on a particular loan, the loan of concern is booked as a non-
performing loan. Non-performing loans are categorized into non-accrual loans, past-due 
loans, or troubled debt restructuring (TDR). Non-accrual loans are loans that do not 
40 
 
generate interest of which was agreed to be paid upon the conditions when lending to the 
borrower. Once the loan starts not to accrue interests, it is categorized as a non-accrual loan 
regardless of the post-90-day due from the scheduled payment. On the other hand, past-
due loans are generated when a loan payment has not been made as of the 90th day past its 
due date. Past-due loans can still generate interests, which make past-due loans distinct 
from non-accrual loans. Once the loan is marked as non-accrual or past-due, the bank now 
becomes incentivized to ease the terms of contract to at least partially collect the promised 
payments of principle and interest. Therefore, the bank creates a troubled debt restructure 
that may lower or erase interest payments or even remove part of the debt on the principle 
itself. Any negative difference between the renegotiated amount of future cashflow and the 
outstanding principal amount from initial contract is accounted for in the loan loss 
provisions (Wahlen, 1994). Unless the bank specified a collateral in the initial contract to 
cover for the losses in case of a non-payment, non-accrual loans and past due loans are 
highly likely to end up as a loss to the bank. From a managerial standpoint, non-performing 
loans are realized values of expected loss and there is little room for any managerial 
discretion in constructing such measures.  Once the bank identifies expected loan losses, 
they make changes to their allowance that was sets aside as a reserve. Managers can deploy 
more discretion and control over allowances and provisions in terms of calculation and 
book keeping.  
Loan loss provision In order to understand the loan loss provisions, one must understand 
the concept of loan loss reserves, commonly known as allowance for loan loss leases 
(ALLL). To put it simple, loan loss reserves is a balance sheet contra to accounts 
receivables. Banks are required by the federal banking regulators (Federal Deposit 
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Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Federal Reserve) to 
set aside an expense as a buffer for their future loan losses (Walter, 1991). Generally, the 
amount set aside as reserve is around 2% - 2.5% of the outstanding accounts receivables. 
Loan loss provision is a forecasting measure that calculates the change in loan loss 
allowances. According to the AICPA Guide Audits of Banks (1983), the essence of loan 
loss provisions is to adjust the loan loss reserves in order to reflect the expected loan losses 
(Ahmed, Takeda, & Thomas, 1998). Loan loss reserves are increased and income is 
decreased once the loan losses provisions are updated reflecting actual foreseeable loan 
losses (Wahlen, 1994). The main determinants of loan loss provisions can be narrowed 
down to loan risk, loan portfolio, and loan income.   𝐿𝐿𝑃 = 𝑓(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘, 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜, 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) 
   Loan risk is a function of the ability of the borrower in making repayments, 
collateral, and the terms of contract upon lending. Such risk may differ depending on the 
type of loan. Typically, loans are categorized into agricultural loans, real estate loans, 
commercial loans, and individual loans. Some banks are heavily weighted towards lending 
real estate loans while others focus on commercial loans.  Loan loss provisions have its 
significance in regards to being a core component of what constitutes a bank’s return on 
assets.  
𝑅𝑂𝐴 = (𝐼𝐼 − 𝐼𝐸)𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − (𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐼𝐸 − 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐼𝐼)𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝐺/𝐿𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
Later in the empirical analysis, I use loan loss provisions to measure a bank’s loan 
quality as loan loss provisions or non-performing loans over total assets represent the 
quality of a bank’s loan lending quality. Unlike non-performing loans, loan loss provisions 
reflect a great deal of manager discretion over the timing of provisions (Wahlen, 1994). I 
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will take advantage of this trait of loan loss provisions to test the post-merger improvement 
in accuracy and timeliness in loan loss forecasting later in Chapter 5.  
Chargeoffs Chargeoffs are realized losses due to loan default when a consumer becomes 
delinquent on a debt. Therefore, the outstanding balance of this uncollectible loan is 
deducted from the loan loss reserve. Although a chargeoff is generally considered as a non-
discretionary measure, the timing of report may involve managers’ discretion. The only 
non-discretionary measure among the loan risk measures would be non-performing loans 
as there is a strict regulation of 90 days non-payment that determines whether a loan is 
performing or not.  The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) 
guidelines advise banks to report chargeoffs after 180 days of delinquency or 60 days after 
receiving notification of bankruptcy from the court (http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
releases/chargeoff/). Although there are cases where federal bank regulators may involve 
in declaring certain loan chargeoffs, chargeoffs are generally decided by the individual 
bank (Wahlen, 1994).  
 
Efforts to Improve Loan Risk  
Because loan losses comprise a significant portion in calculating the bank’s 
financial performance, bank managers strive to improve loan risk. There are various means 
to achieve greater loan quality where, typically, managers would renegotiate the terms of 
lending, seek another entity that would take out the troublesome loan, or update their 
monitoring system to identify troublesome loans at the earliest possible.  
When the bank detects possible default in loan payments or when loans are 
categorized as non-performing loans, the bank renegotiates the terms of the initial contract 
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in order to collect partial or full amount of the principle. The terms that are negotiated 
include interest rates, payment due dates, or even the amount of principle itself. Another 
method to improve loan quality includes banks engaging in financial transactions to sell 
the troubled loan to a different entity, which is called factoring in financial terms. For 
example, Xenith Bank started working with factoring companies in order to improve loan 
quality of their new unit that was acquired due to expansion aspirations. While Xenith bank 
considers the operations and cashflows of their clients who are mostly small and middle 
size business owners, the factoring company they took in were only interested in the 
strength of the clients of those business owners. Due to the difference in evaluating the 
strength of clients, loans that were considered as troublesome loans to Xenith were not too 
much of a concern to the factoring company and the factoring company took out a large 
portion of loans that Xenith was bothered with. Lastly, banks would invest in their 
monitoring technology or update any risk forecasting systems or policies to better detect 
loan defaults or better prepare for loan defaults. In an interview with the CTO of a large 
U.S. based bank, information management is considered one of the major ways to improve 
loan risk. Timely, comprehensive, and accurate information is crucial in detecting and 
determining delinquency in loan payments. Banks make continuous effort in validation and 
remediation of inaccuracy and such efforts are often augmented by certain exogenous 
events such as inter-firm mergers. 
Using data collected in the U.S. commercial banking industry, the following two 
chapters study the feasibility of the aforementioned theoretical perspectives on the efficacy 
of learning by teaching in the organizational context.     
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Chapter 4 
Empirical Study Testing Learning by Teaching in Bank Loan Quality Selection 
Introduction 
“The process of teaching …gives a deeper insight into the subject taught” Comenius, 17th-Century 
Philosopher, Father of Modern Education (Wagner, 1982) 
“The whole art of teaching is only the art of awakening the natural curiosity of young minds for 
the purpose of satisfying it afterwards.” (Anatole France) 
 
Scholars in organizational studies have often focused on two major learning 
mechanisms: experiential learning and vicarious learning. This study tests the efficacy of 
an additional learning by teaching mechanism that has been neglected in the management 
literature. In this study, I attempt to identify the learning benefits of mergers, which are 
distinct from synergy effects, that acquiring firms may exploit during their interactions 
with their newly acquired affiliates. I argue that an integration process provides the 
acquiring firm with an opportunity to teach the acquired firm in a training program the 
acquiring firm’s systems and routines, which subsequently triggers an opportunity for the 
acquiring firm to re-evaluate and reinforce its current knowledge and capabilities. While 
traditional studies in organizational learning build upon the premise of acquisition of new 
knowledge related to improving a focal activity, this paper adopts a different angle by 
proposing the possibility of firms learning from their own knowledge and capabilities and 
improving without the pre-requisite of acquiring new knowledge. Using data from the U.S. 
commercial banking industry from 1998 to 2009, I examine a learning by teaching effect 
associated with bank holding companies who acquire new banks and the conditions that 
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facilitate the efficacy of the proposed mechanism. In the empirical analysis, I find evidence 
that subsequent to an acquisition, there is improvement in loan quality of the acquiring 
firm’s pre-existing affiliates especially when the acquiring firm and the acquired firm share 
similar capabilities. This paper finds its novelty in exploring and developing a new 
construct of learning by teaching and its pragmatic implication for managers who are 
involved in post-merger integration.  
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 Inter-firm acquisitions are considered a complex activity and the degree of 
complexity is determined by the goals of acquisition, whether the acquisition took place in 
order to learn unique and superior skills of the target entity or whether the acquiring firm 
intends to expand its market coverage without investing in establishing additional affiliates, 
or the perspective of integration, deciding on the degree of integration or autonomy along 
a continuous spectrum. The reason that theory on acquisitions are difficult to reach 
consensus is because every acquisition differs by multiple dimensions in each case and 
firms need to create different processes and rules on how fast to move, how carefully to 
implement, and who takes responsibility in major roles, etc. (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). 
Although the underlying reasons and conditions behind a merger decision is yet to be 
articulated, some acquisitions are surprisingly simple in terms of their straightforward 
goals and forms decided by top management of the acquiring firms. Clear expectations of 
firm executives on the value creation via acquisitions often entail effective and fast 
execution of the integration process. Based on multiple interviews with bank managers 
who have extensive experience in acquisition decision making and implementation, many 
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integration processes end up in a top-down management style where the acquiring firm 
transfers its routines, systems, and culture to the acquired firm. The likelihood of top-down 
management is expected to be greater for firms who aim to expand geographically and 
acquire low performers instead of establishing a new unit from scratch. Arguably, better 
performing firms are likely to believe in the superiority of their own knowledge and 
capabilities and therefore are likely to engage more in transferring knowledge in areas 
where they are already performing well. Otherwise, if the acquired firm is superior in terms 
of skills and performance, the acquiring firm would want to learn and absorb new and better 
capabilities rather than enforcing their own inferior ones to the acquired firm. Therefore, I 
argue that vertical knowledge transfer (top-down management) would most likely occur 
when the acquiring firm is superior in terms of performance to the acquired firm and the 
spare managerial capacity allows the acquiring firm to identify and learn from training 
benefits during the interaction and coordination processes of integrations.    
Hereby I argue: 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the parent’s performance superiority to the target at 
the time of merger the better the loan performance of the parent’s affiliates 
following the acquisition 
Firms not only aim to acquire superior skills from different entities but also aspire 
to learn different skills or complementary knowledge from inter-firm interactions. One of 
the most apparent ways to obtain this goal is to acquire a different organization that 
possesses such knowledge or capabilities of interest. Regardless of how great the acquiring 
firm’s performance, if the firm’s goal of acquisition is to purchase the different skill sets, 
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the acquiring firm will learn from the acquired unit. Therefore, it is argued that mergers 
between distant firms in terms of capabilities will entail knowledge transfer from both 
directions. Although a decent degree of training still takes place in cases where the 
acquiring firm intends to learn from the acquired firm, due to limited managerial capacity, 
the learning effects that can be obtained through teaching would be of second priority and 
would not be salient when the managers’ mental capacities are occupied by earning more 
obvious gains. I argue that managers would prioritize acquiring new and novel knowledge 
over reconfiguring, restoration, and revamping current and old knowledge. Hence, when 
the acquired entity possesses greater degree of distant or complementary knowledge, 
managers would spend any spare managerial capabilities in acquiring new knowledge 
leaving less mental capacity to engage in improvements that are triggered by a teaching 
process.   
Hypothesis 2: Higher proximity in activity domains between parent and target 
increases the positive relationship between the parent’s performance superiority 
to the target at the time of merger and the loan performance of the parent’s 
affiliates 
The efficiency of knowledge transfer relies partially on the cultural similarities 
between the transferring and receiving entity (Bhagat, Keida, Harveston, and Triandis, 
2002).  Related task experience increases proficiency in capability sets (Littlepage, 
Robison and Reddington, 1997) and subsequently improves learning to a greater extent 
(Schilling, Vidal, Ployhart, and Marangoni, 2003). Teams that are involved in related tasks 
share similar background in knowledge and therefore recognition and utilization of 
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expertise is facilitated when such entities work together (Littlepage, Robison, and 
Reddington, 1997). When learning occurs to one entity, other entities that share similar 
structure, institutional mechanisms, or culture can more frequently and speedily recognize 
the created value and adopt the new knowledge to current processes of their own. A large 
body of research on related diversification discusses the advantages that firms can reap 
from similar capabilities in knowledge transfer (Singh & Montgomery, 1987; Salter and 
Weinhold, 1979; Markides & Williamson, 1994). Entities that share common distribution 
systems can create a new strategic asset at a faster pace or at a lower cost and in turn 
improve the quality in existing assets (Markides & Williamson, 1994). Similar to the value 
created through economies of scale and scope in related diversifications, the learnings from 
a teaching process can diffuse to the acquiring firm’s other affiliates and generate value via 
the same mechanism. When affiliates of a parent firm who recently acquired and learned 
from the interactions with the newly acquired unit, the improved skills can equally apply 
and distribute to other affiliates if the affiliates share similar operational activities. The 
parent firm can exploit the interrelationships among its different affiliates and conduct a 
faster and more efficient knowledge transfer while at the same time applying what has been 
learnt to different contexts and achieving economies of scale and scope (Markides & 
Williamson, 1994). Hereby, I argue that the diffusion of learning by teaching is facilitated 
when there is greater homogeneity within parent’s affiliates.  
Hypothesis 3: Greater homogeneity in the parent’s affiliates increases the positive 
relationship between the parent’s performance superiority to the target at the 
time of merger and the loan performance of the parent’s affiliates 
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While learning by teaching may share similar traits with the conventional learning 
by doing mechanism, there are aspects that are unique to the learning by teaching 
mechanism. Unlike the traditional learning where frequent and intense accumulation of a 
focal activity contributes to recognizing avenues of improvement and creating greater value 
from the activity of interest, learning by teaching needs gaps between the first teaching 
opportunity and its subsequent teaching opportunity. Frequent acquisitions reduce contents 
to learning from revisiting, recombining, or revamping knowledge. Similar to time 
compression diseconomies where it takes time to accumulate resource and knowledge, 
once an adjustment has been made in the errors within a firm’s current procedures, it takes 
time to accumulate “enough errors” for the next teaching opportunity to contribute to 
discovering and improving any additional inefficiency.  Therefore, learning by teaching 
requires time gaps, which is contrary to the traditional learning mechanism. Hereby I argue 
that there are time compression diseconomies in learning by teaching and the frequent 
acquisitions would reduce the efficacy of learning by teaching.  
Hypothesis 4: Higher frequency in the parent’s acquisition experience decreases 
the positive relationship between the parent’s performance superiority to the 
target at the time of merger and the loan performance of the parent’s affiliates 
Methodology 
In this study, I test the impact of learning by teaching on a firm’s loan quality 
management. In this section, I describe the comprehensive sample of U.S commercial 
banks, followed by the model specification and descriptions of key variables.  
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Data  
The U.S. banking industry is a suitable context for this study for the following 
reasons. Strict regulation and standardized reporting requirements allows to obtain data for 
the full census of US banks. Regulation also allows identifying a broad set of characteristics, 
such as loan inputs and outputs, or various size measures both at the parent (bank holding 
company) and affiliate (bank) level. I collect archival data from the FDIC Research 
Database of quarterly financial data for all commercial banks filing the Y-9C (Call Report). 
Each bank is allocated a unique certificate number by the FDIC and I take the bank holding 
company (BHC) as a parent firm that acquires its consistuent banks. I merge the FDIC Call 
reports that provide extensive financial data of each individual commercial bank and the 
link between holding companies and affiliated bank with the Income Statements and 
Balance Sheet data collected from the WRDS database. This allows me to construct a panel 
with loan portfolio information and the three distinct measures of forecasting: loan loss 
provisions, non-performing loans, and charge-offs. The panel provides me with a total of 
1360 BHCs involving in acquisition cases over years 1998-2009.  
 
Measures 
Dependent variable  In order to capture the performance improvement in loan risk 
management, I take the loan quality as the dependent variable. Loan quality is measure by 
subtracting the fraction of loan loss provisions to total assets of the bank holding company 
from 1. I measure the dependent variable by calculating the weighted average of the parent 
firm’s existing affiliates prior to the acquisition. In order to tease apart any direct impact, 
whether it is negative or positive, of the performance level of the target firm that has been 
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acquired, the dependent measure excludes the performance of the actual bank who engaged 
in the acquisition and integration practice.   
Independent variables The parent’s performance superiority is measured in order 
to test the identification of learning by teaching. When the parent firm superiority to the 
target firm is greater, it is argued that the integration style would likely be a top-down 
management triggering extensive amount of teaching rather than allowing interactions that 
bears potential opportunities to exchange superior capabilities between the parent and 
target. I use two different types of superiority measures, one is constructed as the difference 
in loan quality between the parent and target firm and the other is the difference in return 
on assets (ROA) between the two firms as a robustness check.  
Moderating variables  To test the interaction effect in hypotheses 2, I create a 
portfolio distance measure using the Cosine similarity distance. As for the interaction effect 
in hypotheses 3, I calculate the affiliate similarity in terms of portfolio composition among 
the parent firm’s affiliates prior to the focal acquisition in a similar fashion as in calculating 
portfolio distance. Lastly, in order to test the interaction effect proposed in hypotheses 4, I 
count the frequency in acquisitions using the average number of acquisitions that a single 
bank holding company conducts within a given year.      
Control variables   Traditionally, firm size is viewed as to play a major role in 
acquisitions (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Rumelt, 1974; Demsetz and Strahan, 1997). Firms with 
greater asset sizes are arguably more capable and have greater absorptive capacity that 
enhances the firm’s learning capability. Because of the skewness in asset size across banks 
in the industry, I take the log of total assets of each bank to control for any size effects. I 
also include values of quarterly state personal income, state population, number of 
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competitors, and state herfindahl index to control for state specific characteristics as well 
as the economic microenvironment factors. While it is more common to use GDP instead 
of personal income index to capture macroeconomic effects, due to the unavailability of 
GDP data at the state and quarterly level, I proxy this measure with the personal income 
that shows a 99.58 correlation with GDP data. To control for scale and scope, I include the 
number of banks held by a single bank holding company as well as the number of states 
that a single bank holding company operates in.  
 
Model Specification 
The first model uses a fixed effect regression model to control for any particular firm-year 
fixed unobservable effects.  
 
Baseline Model 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛	𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(DEF)GHI= 𝛽K + 𝛽I𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦DFGEI+ 𝛽O	𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦DFGEI	 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒DFGEI+	𝛽R	𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦DFGEI ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑦DFGEI+	𝛽U	𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦DFGEI ∗	𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦DFGEI+ 	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀 
Where, Loan Quality = 1-(LLP/Total Assets) 
  i=parent firm 
  j=target firm 
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Lambda variable 
I use a Heckman selection model in order to correct for possible endogeneity bias. This is 
to control for any underlying reasons that allow certain firms to engage in poor performing 
firm acquisitions. Because of the high likelihood of the market hitting the bank if they 
acquire a firm with low performance, there might be a reason to why some firms choose to 
acquire low performers and to what allows them to do so. In the first stage, I derive the 
inverse mills ratio lambda term by modelling the parent firm’s propensity to acquire a poor 
performing firm as a function of the tier 1 capital. Tier 1 capital is a typical measure of the 
capital adequacy of a bank that consists of the common stock and disclosed reserves. The 
funds are considered as the primary support for any losses to the bank that would protect 
its regular businesses from financial difficulty. Arguably, a greater amount of tier 1 capital 
would allow buffers to afford any potential losses caused by acquiring a poor performing 
target firm. In the second stage, the inverse mills ratio lambda term is included in the 
regression (model 3 in table 6) to correct for endogeneity of low performing target 
acquisition.     
 
Final Model 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛	𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(DEF)GHI= 𝛽K + 𝛽I𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦DFGEI+ 𝛽O	𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦DFGEI	 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒DFGEI+	𝛽R	𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦DFGEI ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑦DFGEI+	𝛽U	𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦DFGEI ∗	𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦DFGEI + 𝛽Z𝜆+ 	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀 
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Where, Loan Quality = 1-(LLP/Total Assets) 
  i=parent firm 
  j=target firm 
 
 
Results 
Table 2 & 3 summarizes the data of 1360 bank holding companies that involved in 
acquisitions expanded into a panel providing me with 2559 observation points over years 
from 1998 to 2009. Because I use a 1-year lag to construct the dependent variable, I 
dropped year 2009 from the analysis. Also, I purposefully use data from prior to the 2007 
– 2009 financial crisis as the acquisition pattern of banks was altered due to institutional 
intervention. Table 4 shows correlations matrix for the explanatory variables and controls. 
Tables 5 shows the results from a fixed effects model by the unique bank id and 
given year that tests the proposed hypotheses. In model 1, I test for the control variables in 
isolation. Some of the control variables merit attention. The state level competition 
represented by the Herfindahl index significantly increases the quality of loans suggesting 
that the more concentrated the local market is, banks are arguably provided with greater 
capacity to focus on exploiting from current operations rather than having managerial 
capacity caught up by the competitive nature of the market. Bank holding company size is 
represented by total assets and the number of banks that they hold, which shows positive 
and significant impact on the overall banks’ loan quality. This could infer to the fact that 
larger organizations are composed of greater number of agents that pool their knowledge 
and capabilities that lead to greater degree of learning (Posen, Martignoni, & Levinthal, 
2012). To measure a bank’s experience in market diversification, I use the number of states 
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where a single holding company operates in, of which coefficients show positive and 
significant impact suggesting that past experience in multiple markets improves loan 
quality through honing the capability sets of the holding company.  
Models 2-8 examine the main effects of parent superiority and interacting variables 
on the improvement of loan quality that arguably indicates the effect of learning by 
teaching. Results support Hypothesis 1 with positive coefficients and significance at the 
0.01 level. This confirms the argument on the impact of the relative superiority of the parent 
firm to the target firm on the extent to which the focal parent firm learns through teaching 
the target and consequently improves the overall loan performance across all affiliates held 
by the parent firm. I add loan proximity between parent and target, loan similarity among 
parent’s affiliates, and frequency in acquisitions within a given year to the model, which 
tests the effect of the moderating conditions of learning by teaching. Results support 
Hypothesis 3 and 4 with a negative coefficient and significance at the 0.01 level suggesting 
that diversity in parent’s affiliates will hinder the efficient diffusion of learning by teaching 
and that frequent acquisitions would decrease the available content for learning by teaching. 
One possible reason to why Hypothesis 3 would not hold could be because the degree of 
teaching is dominated by the performance difference between the parent and target firm 
regardless of whether there are certain skills to be learned from the target. Moreover, if it 
were the skills that are being acquired from the target firm that contributes to future 
performance improvement, then we could expect the proximity variable to have a negative 
and significant effect.  
Because one may concern the existence of selection bias towards superior bank 
holding companies engaging in poor performing target acquisitions and the endogeneity 
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issue associated with the context, I conduct a robust test using a Heckman selection bias 
model. As the exclusion restriction, I use the tier 1 capital level that would arguably affect 
the propensity to acquiring poor performing firms. Because the excess capital allows a 
buffer for the temporary loss that incurs from the underperforming target bank until the 
parent transfers superior capabilities and brings the target up to standards, higher tier 1 
capital level allows the bank to take greater risks in the choice of their acquisition target. 
Yet, I find no theoretical evidence that a greater level of tier 1 capital directly influences 
the quality in loan management, which provides validity to the choice of exclusion 
restriction.    
As shown in model 1 - 4 from table 6, the main results and the supporting result for 
hypothesis 4, which argues that the relatedness in knowledge across a parent firm’s 
affiliates facilitates the application of the benefits that stem from learning by teaching, 
remain consistent with the fixed effects analysis.  
 
Discussion 
Overall, the empirical findings are consistent with my predictions and support the 
theoretical arguments. Specifically, I find that acquiring firms that are superior to the 
acquired target are more adept to improving loan performance. This effect is more 
pronounced when the parent firm’s affiliates are homogeneous and when there have been 
less opportunities to learn from integration in previous terms. I do not find any statistically 
significant impact of portfolio similarity between parent and target firm on the efficacy of 
learning by teaching. Results suggest that the decision on the extent to which the firm 
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involves in a teaching activity is most likely dominated by the performance difference and 
not the difference in skill sets.  
By empirically confirming the predictions, this study provides implications to the 
literature in the following ways. This paper contributes to the vast learning literature in 
strategic management and organization theory by providing a new theoretical construct 
that extends our understanding of knowledge acquisition and knowledge management. 
Specifically, I propose a learning by teaching mechanism where firms that involve in 
activities such as post-merger integration or consulting and therefore associate with 
extensive amount of training can develop superior knowledge and capabilities as a result 
of a teaching opportunity. Although learning by teaching is a well-known topic in other 
areas of social studies and has been studied largely in experiments to investigate the effect 
of teaching on individuals’ performance (Katona, 1940; Bargh and Schul, 1980; Benware 
& Deci, 1984; Fiorella & Mayer, 2013; Fiorella & Mayer, 2014), little work has been done 
on the theoretical development and, to the best of my knowledge, this dissertation is the 
first to study the applications of learning by teaching at the organizational level.   
This study also contributes to the acquisition literature by providing a more fine-
grained integration type that considers the explorative and exploitative benefits when 
absorbing a new entity. In their seminal work, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) develop a 
framework of integration types that are determined by the need for interdependence to 
create value and the need for autonomy. The authors propose three major types of 
integration: absorption, preservation, and symbiosis. Unlike preservation and symbiosis 
where learning comes from the acquisition of unique knowledge and capability sets, it is 
quite unclear to how learning occurs in an absorption type of integration. Hence, I focus 
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on the absorption integration type where little autonomy is granted and therefore major 
training is involved in order to help the acquired entity to adapt to the acquiring firm’s 
systems and routines. The degree of interdependence of knowledge and capabilities from 
both acquired and acquiring firm required to create value plays an important role in 
distinguishing between a two-way transfer and one-way transfer of knowledge. In 
Haspeslagh and Jemison’s work (1991), the interdependency of knowledge and capabilities 
between the two merging entities bears an assumption that the direction of knowledge flow 
is in both directions; the acquiring firm learns from the acquired firm and vice versa. 
However, in many real cases of acquisitions, absorption is chosen as the form of integration 
although there is no interdependence of knowledge or capabilities between the merging 
firms such as in the case where firms acquire for scale expansion reasons. Under such 
circumstances, the direction of knowledge flow is highly likely a one-way capability 
transfer and the learning by teaching mechanism is arguably most salient when there is 
slack managerial capacity not being occupied by absorbing new information. This 
dissertation contributes to the acquisition literature by introducing a learning mechanism 
that triggers an exploitative type of absorptive integration.  
Finally, this paper also contributes to the evolutionary literature through a provision 
of a wider application of dynamic capabilities and absorptive capacity. Firm expansion and 
integration causes much change and disruption to within the focal firm’s boundaries and, 
also, to the external competitive landscape. Therefore, firms that experience any type of 
acquisition and integration are revealed to the necessity of reconfiguring its capability sets 
in order to conform to the dynamic change (Teece, Pisano, Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003; Helfat, Finkelstein, Mitchell, Peteraf, Singh, Teece, and 
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Winter ,2009). While substantial research has explored the antecedents and significance of 
dynamic capabilities, findings in this area of research are limited to the firm components 
and conditions interconnected to the market environments and the development of the 
constituents of dynamic capabilities. Many prominent scholars have theorized in prior 
research on the discrete types of dynamic capabilities such as adaptive, absorptive, and 
innovative capabilities that are developed within the firm in accordance to the firm’s 
environmental change (Teece et al, 1997; Gibson and Brikinshaw, 2004; Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Capron et al, 1992; Wang and Ahmed, 2007). However, it is yet to be 
fully unraveled how such different types of dynamic capabilities can interact with one 
another to create greater value in one’s capabilities. This study sheds light on the 
evolutionary nature of knowledge and capabilities during a special situation of post-merger 
integration where a teaching opportunity promotes the intertwined development of 
adaptive, absorptive, and dynamic capabilities that lead to capability updating and 
improvements in the focal firm’s routine and operating processes.  
This study is not without limitations. First, the analysis has its limitations in the 
indirect measures of learning by teaching. Although I try to capture the teaching 
opportunity through constraining the environment to where parent superiority derives 
teaching, a more direct measure of teaching such as number of teaching materials or the 
amount of investment in integration could support a more rigorous analysis. Second, while 
this paper is limited to the learning by teaching opportunity in post-merger integrations, 
future work can also examine other empirical contexts. For instance, teaching can occur 
under circumstances where employee training is heavily implemented such as in executive 
training. Future research may explore a more generalized application of learning by 
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teaching effects. Finally, future work can build from our predictions and develop theory 
the learning by teaching mechanism by testing for additional moderating effects. 
Identifying conditions that would lead to more salient effects of learning by teaching would 
supplement findings from this paper.  
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Chapter 5 
Empirical Study Testing Learning by Teaching in Loan Risk Forecasting 
Introduction 
 This study explores the impact of learning by teaching on the improvements in loan 
risk management that are related to the capabilities of bank managers. While the previous 
empirical study in Chapter 4 explored the efficacy and diffusion of learning by teaching by 
examining the performance of the parent firm’s affiliates, which excludes the actual firm 
who acquired a new entity after an acquisition, this chapter investigates the direct impact 
of learning by teaching on the firm who actually engages in the first-hand teaching 
experience. I look into the improvement of a particular task of timely loan loss provisioning, 
which is arguably less likely to be affected by numerous conditional factors as do general 
performance measures.   
Many great scholars in the field of strategic management and organizational studies 
have advanced our understanding by empirically testing the impact of organizational 
learning using various performance measures. Much scholarly attention has focused on the 
market- and accounting-based performance using ROA, ROE, or stock price as the 
response variable. For instance, Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger, and Weber (1992) 
investigate how the acquisition of new knowledge and capabilities can convert into positive 
returns through the facilitation of organizational cultural fit. In particular the authors look 
into the increased changes in stockholder value after a related merger. Some studies, on the 
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other hand, provide evidence of a positive relationship between accumulation of experience 
or acquisition of knowledge and the firm’s symbolic performance as in status, identity, or 
power (Pollock, Chen, Jackson, & Hambrick, 2010l; Ullrich, Wieseke, & Dick, 2005).  In 
their paper, Ullrich, Wieseke, and Dick (2005) find supporting evidence on the impact of 
integration processes on organizational identification, which in turn imposes influence to 
firm performances. Another considerable body of research, including the seminal work of 
Ahuja & Katila (2001), measures the effect of organizational learning on a firm’s 
innovative performance by exploring the increase in innovative activities in terms of patent 
developments. Despite this theoretical significance and abundance of related studies, the 
organizational learning literature seems to await further research efforts in terms of 
identifying learning at a lower level of unit and adopting fresh perspectives towards 
additional learning mechanisms. In this paper, I try to adopt a more fine-grained measure 
by looking into the improvement of a particular task, rather than a granular performance 
measure, as a result of organizational learning by teaching. In particular, I use the Delayed 
Expected Loss Recognition model widely known in the field of accounting to investigate 
the improvement in the timeliness of loan loss provisioning at financial institutions.  
 This paper aspires to empirically capture learning at a task-level and extend our 
knowledge on the implementation and realization of learning by teaching. Using the 
theoretical arguments gleaned from the previous chapters in this dissertation on 
organizational learning by teaching, I focus on the mechanisms that are realized during the 
preparation stage of teaching rather than the stage of engaging with students. As discussed 
in previous chapters, the core mechanisms of learning by teaching stems from the reflection 
of the teacher’s knowledge. Numerous theoretical contributions have been made on the 
63 
 
significant role of reflection on individual learning. For example, Boud, Keogh, and 
Walker (1985) states that reflection is “an important human activity in which people 
recapture their experience, think about it, mull it over and evaluate it”, and affects the 
degree of learning from a given experience. The authors argue that reflection is likely to 
occur towards the end of a learning process, which implies that the focal entity needs to 
accumulate knowledge and experience before he or she can reflect upon the focal 
knowledge and learn. This argument is consistent with the theoretical development in 
education and psychology literature where reflection is recognized as a core mechanism 
for a teacher’s learning. The role of a teacher is granted with the assumption that the 
individual is qualified in terms of being knowledgeable in the subject to be taught. 
Therefore, it is arguable that there is a high probability that a teacher would reflect upon 
his or her own knowledge related to the subject matter than individuals who are deliberately 
starting to learn new information.    
  When teaching other individuals, teachers often reflect upon their own knowledge, 
which means that the teachers try to transform current complex and challenging 
information into efficient forms of new knowledge in order to transfer the focal knowledge 
to other people. In this chapter, I attempt to identify the consequences of reflection at the 
organizational level where training opportunities trigger firm managers to revisit and 
reflect upon their current knowledge and reconfigure current operational processes or 
systems to adopt superior ones. Schön (2017) studies how reflection is implemented upon 
practitioners in the healthcare industry and suggests that reflection is triggered by a shock 
or an unusual event. For a physician, the trigger can be an unanticipated result, whether it 
is good or bad, during an operation. Reflection can also occur with a collection of incidents. 
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The practitioner may encounter multiple outcomes when dealing with a group of patient or 
specific disease (Rolfe, Freshwater, & Jasper, 2001). Even casual conversations with 
colleagues or patients or reading articles from the newspaper or journals can be triggers to 
reflective learning as does organizational audits of practice in which physicians obtain 
related information to the focal practice (Lockyer, Gondocz,  & Thivierge, 2004). When 
reflection is triggered at a group level of an organization, the learning can be diffused 
throughout the organization via internal networks or official strategic planning.     
As much as there are factors that trigger reflective learning, there are, in fact, 
conditions that hinder one from reflecting upon knowledge. Lockyer, Gondocz, and 
Thivierge (2004) discovers a positive relationship between personal experiences and 
organizational feedback and the degree of reflection while lack of time, available 
colleagues, and social networks are  conditions that impose a negative impact on an 
individual’s degree of reflection. A member of an organization is expected to meet certain 
demands in terms of professional and social commitments. Often times these individuals 
are both physically and cognitively caught up in regular operations and meetings and end 
up utilizing maximum capacity of one’s own cognitive capabilities. When individuals lack 
time by getting pulled into multiple tasks simultaneously, they do not have the mental 
capacity to explore new connections between existing or new knowledge. A teaching 
activity, however, secures this opportunity that other tasks would generally provide less 
because teaching requires an investment of time and effort towards preparing teaching 
materials. In other words, the act of teaching legitimately creates the time to revisit current 
relationships across fractions of knowledge and to create new inferences.   
At a bank, teaching takes place to serve various purposes. It could occur when the 
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bank needs to bring new hires up to speed for daily operations, allocate new responsibilities 
and roles to current employees or executives, or improve systems, standards, or structure 
as part of a top-down strategic purpose. One of the primary concerns of a commercial bank 
is to improve operations and standards to respond to current and future environmental 
uncertainty. There are largely three types of risks that challenge a bank’s performance. The 
first type is credit risk, which is the possibility of borrowers failing to meet the payment 
obligations on time. The second type is market risk, which refers to losses incurred due to 
fluctuations in the economy and market prices. The last type of bank risk is operational risk 
defined as the loss from failed internal processes or from external events. The banking 
system as a whole regularly discusses and seeks for new standards and creates additional 
safety nets to prevent bank failure caused by such unforeseeable hazards. Because a bank’s 
performance highly relies on how well the bank prevents itself from negative shocks from 
bank risk, it is one of the biggest concerns of a bank manager to look out for supervision 
and improve daily operations. The current chapter focuses on one of the core efforts 
promoted by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) to reduce bank risk, 
which is to incorporate future expected losses into current provisioning practices. The 
Basel II and III Accord introduced new accounting methods to protect banks form 
procyclicality, which includes the promotion of forward-looking provisioning. Accounting 
research suggests that forward-looking provisioning reflects greater timeliness and 
accuracy of a bank manager’s estimation to loan losses. Arguably, banks that had superior 
managerial and operational capabilities adopted the new standards before Basel II and III 
Accord strongly emphasized the significance of the forward-looking provisioning practice 
after the 2001 and 2007-2009 financial crisis. This chapter discusses how a teaching 
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opportunity could possibly increase the probability of a bank adopting superior financial 
standards. Banks that engage in mergers and acquisitions face the need to train new 
employees from the acquired bank and convert the acquired bank’s systems and procedures 
of general operations to meet the acquiring firm’s standards. During the integration process, 
the acquiring bank’s managers who engage in training opportunities are exposed to the 
opportunity to reflect upon their current knowledge base and to seek better ways of risk 
management.  
The empirical analysis in this chapter takes the privilege of the available data prior 
to and after the introduction of the Basel Accord, which was a result of poorly managed 
bank risk practices prompting additional advisory from the BCBS. After each 2001 and 
2007 – 2009 financial crisis, regulations have strongly required banks to pursue forward 
looking provisioning instead of the commonly used incurred loss approach. Later in this 
chapter, I will address in detail the post-crisis Basel Accord where documentation and re-
evaluation on loan loss measures were suggested in their guidelines to worldwide 
commercial banks. The use of the Basel Accord guidelines allows us to explore how some 
firms adopted superior capabilities related to timely and accurate documentation of loan 
losses prior to the intervention of the BCBS while others were enforced by the BCBS to 
catch up on this better practice later after the post-crisis regulatory implementations. While 
it is argued that firms who were exposed to the opportunity to learn from a teaching 
opportunity had already improved risk management by exerting greater timeliness and 
accuracy of loan loss provisioning compared to those who did not have the opportunity to 
learn by teaching, institutional intervention eases the amount of difference between the two 
groups by enforcing regulation that would substitute the effect of learning by teaching. I 
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adopt a Delayed Expected Loss Recognition model widely known in accounting research 
to test the efficacy of learning by teaching at a task-level.  
This study contributes to the organizational learning literature by empirically 
testing the effect of a novel learning mechanism at the firm level by capturing the impact 
of teaching on the firm who directly engages in the knowledge transferring activity. While 
it is a common challenge to researchers in organizational studies to empirically measure 
the effect of learning per se, I try to track down the learning effect using a proxy of 
timeliness in loan loss provisioning.  Second, this study finds its novelty in the empirical 
study with the available data prior to and after two incidents of financial crisis. The 
guidelines promoted by BCBS and the publication of Basel II and III after the financial 
crisis provides a natural setting where banks changed their behavior and adopted different 
tools for risk management. Lastly, this study provides pragmatic implications for firm 
managers. With the full spectrum of organizational learning taking place, firm managers 
can consciously look after the benefits they can rake during an integration process or annual 
employee training program. I will discuss future research opportunities at the end of this 
section.  
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Within the context of firm acquisitions, I argue that the acquisition of a target firm 
yields a learning by teaching effect to the acquiring firm through a knowledge restoration 
and capability reinforcement process during the preparation and implementation of 
capability transmission from the acquirer to the target firm. Transferring knowledge and 
materials to an audience that may not own the complementary knowledge or capabilities 
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requires an interim treatment on the material by the “teacher” in order to make the 
information of interest easier to understand. The advantages of learning by teaching can be 
easily found in, but not limited to, industries where firms involve in licensing contracts or 
acquisition activities. This study examines the US commercial banking industry from 1998 
to 2015 to exploit a unique setting provided by the 2001 and 2007 - 2009 financial crisis. 
After the inter-state banking deregulation in 1984, U.S. commercial banks were actively 
engaged in inter-state banking expansions and acquisitions (Amel, 1993). When the 
corporate parents acquire a new firm, the integration process naturally entails the need for 
the parent company to teach its superior routines and capabilities to its new member. The 
benefits of the proposed learning by teaching find its difference from synergy effects of 
diversification in terms of the content that the firm learns. Prior acquisition research focus 
on the value creation stemmed from combining two of more distinct firms that possess 
similar or different resources and capabilities (Rumelt, 1974; Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 
1988; Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1991). The main gains to the acquiring firm 
are identified as improved operating efficiency by taking advantage of economies of scope 
and scale, superior skill transfer, or enhanced market power (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & 
Ireland, 1991). Prominent scholars including Rumelt (1982) and Teece (1980) identifies 
efficiency created by utilizing resources and capabilities from a particular unit for the 
operation of another. Economies of scale and scope turned out to be the main supporting 
rationale behind related diversification. Other scholars suggest that the acquisition of 
complementary resources and capabilities help overcome any weaknesses of each firm and 
generate benefits for the acquired entities (Barney, 1986; Hitt & Ireland, 1986; 1985). 
Finally, a stream of research discusses the gain and loss of market power that is associated 
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with diversification through acquisitions (Bradley, Desai, & Kim, 1983; Eckbo, 1983; 
Montgomery, 1985). Despite mixed results and arguments toward whether resource 
similarity in related diversifications leads to greater returns, a vast amount of research finds 
little support to the dominant hypothesis (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1991; 
Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987; Singh & Montgomery, 1987; Hill, Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1992; 
Jones and Hill, 1988; Nayyar, 1992).   
A potential reason why scholars find mixed results is that they neglect a large 
variable from the equation. It is not merely the improvement in efficiency of procedures or 
cost savings by sharing market demands and diverse capabilities that derives above or 
below average market rents but also the development of knowledge and capabilities from 
restoring, reconfiguring and reinforcing the firm’s knowledge base through a teaching or 
training activity during the integration process. In order to tease out the aforementioned 
synergy effects, I focus on a particular capability associated with bank managers, the 
forecasting ability of loan losses, that is less likely to be influenced by cost savings, or 
economies of scale.  
Forward-looking Accounting  Financial accounting measures indicate the 
performance level and financial position of the firm and take on multiple roles in the 
context of corporate governance. Internally, financial data provides the direction for 
managerial planning, supports an internal labor market, and assists director monitoring 
(Bushman & Smith, 2001). In addition, publicly reported financial data provides critical 
information for external parties such as shareholders, investors, and regulators. 
Shareholders use financial data as a tool for monitoring whether the firm performance and 
strategic direction aligns with the shareholders’ interest. Similarly, outside investors use 
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public financial data to analyze the competitive position of the firm within the market and 
to monitor the use of investments. A large body of accounting research focuses on finding 
ways to mitigate the agency problem between firm managers and shareholders and to 
ensure efficient allocation of resources to promising business opportunities. Regulators, on 
the other hand, concern financial data as a mean to audit a firm’s report system and 
financial status in order to protect investors from the aforementioned agency problems. 
While relying on the given data provided by insiders, regulators also constantly review the 
current reporting systems to reduce opportunities for agents to take advantage of in order 
to serve their own interest and protect the industry from cyclical risks.  
In the banking industry, while it is at the bank manager’s interest to provide 
accounting information to external parties for contractual purposes or decision making, 
regulator’s concern lies heavily on reducing the risk of bank failures. Because the 
incentives of practitioners and regulators do not necessarily align with each other, constant 
debate has been made to whether loan loss accounting should allow more discretion to bank 
managers to include future loan losses into current measures. As much as forward-looking 
accounting allows risk mitigation by being more prudent, concerns to whether bank 
managers will opportunistically take advantage of the system to smooth earnings and losses 
remain (Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Wall & Koch, 2000). It is, however, a common voice 
that more consistent, reliable, transparent, and timely information on a bank’s financial 
performance and risk exposures need to be made available for the public (Bushman & 
Williams, 2012).     
Loan loss provisioning, which has direct impact on the volatility of a bank’s 
performance and risks, is a careful choice made by bank managers following guidelines 
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and regulations. Unlike other accounting measures that indicate realized loan losses such 
as charge-offs or non-performing loans, loan loss provisions reflect bank managers’ 
subjective decision and insights that are influenced by environmental factors that may 
affect the realization of loan losses. Research shows that bank managers can forecast future 
loan losses using current term macro-economic indicators (Gambera, 2000; Beatty & Liao, 
2011). As a result, researchers and regulators argue that the prevalent use of incurred loss 
model expose banks to pro-cyclical effects and suggest to grant greater discretion to bank 
managers when predicting future losses and include a broader set of information to the 
assessment (Bushman & Williams, 2012).   
Although the ideal way to test the positive impact of forward-looking accounting 
on the firm’s risk-taking would be to compare directly between firms who adopt an 
incurred loss model and firms who use a forward-looking model, the implementation of 
forward-looking accounting was yet to be available for recent research in this domain. 
Scholars, therefore, have used alternative methods to test the validity and impact of forward 
looking provisions on firm performance. Bushman and Williams (2012) study the 
effectiveness of managerial discretionary on loan risk management by exploiting cross-
country variations in the degree of managerial discretion on loan forecasting. The core 
findings suggest that explicit forward-lookingness enhances the market discipline over 
bank risk-taking.   
Greater concerns towards timeliness in forecasting loan losses had risen after the 
financial crisis in 2001 and 2007 - 2009. Prior to the alarming events the majority of banks 
were prone towards using the incurred loss model, which was later identified as one of the 
core factors that increased bank risks.  
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Based on the theoretical development of learning by teaching mechanisms, I predict 
a higher likelihood of parent banks who acquire new affiliates switching to a superior 
accounting model as a result of training acquired employees. When transferring the systems 
and accounting standards of loan management, the parent bank is likely to revisit their 
current operations and financial standards and reconfigure current routines to meet up-to-
date industry standards. Such behavior can be in part due to the fact that parent firms make 
pre-emptive strikes prior to knowledge transfer as they do not want to be criticized by the 
target firm’s employees especially during times when organizational conflict and resistance 
is highly anticipated throughout the integration process. I argue that the increase in the 
parent’s forecasting timeliness and accuracy would represent the results of learning by 
teaching after an integration process followed by an acquisition. Hereby I predict: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the experience in acquiring firms that perform poorer than the 
focal firm the greater the extent of learning by teaching that is reflected in the improved 
timeliness and accuracy in the parent’s loan loss provisioning  
 
The Basel Accord 
The available data set of at least 5 years prior to and following the initial 
introduction of the Basel Accord in 2004 allows a privilege to examine a more salient 
deviation in firm behavior and performance. Because the regulatory and statutory 
board was concerned with the incurred loss approach, they promoted the Basel Accord 
guidelines to enforce a forward-looking analysis of bank portfolios. While banks that were 
capable of the forward-looking approach in forecasting loan losses already implemented 
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the method prior to the regulatory enforcement, other banks that did not follow this 
advanced approach were forced to do so by regulation.  
Basel II The Basel II Accord has initially been published in 2004 by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in order to control regulatory arbitrage and 
support better risk management (Barr & Miller, 2006; Pattison, 2006; Kane, 2006). Basel 
II mainly provides standards to the capital adequacy of internationally active banks. 
Because the Basel Accords are considered more as guidelines than enforcement laws, the 
implementation of the proposals has been limited.  However, the BCBS strongly insists 
that a full, timely and consistent adoption and implementation of Basel standards is 
necessary in order to help the banking system become more resilient to economic shocks 
and encourage a transparent regulatory environment in the banking industry. Basel II 
introduced a more forward looking provision method. The rationale behind forward 
looking provisioning was to consider the key business environment and internal control 
factors in order to manage operational risk and more directly reflect a bank’s quality of risk 
control. Bank supervisors were asked to require the bank to incorporate the sum of expected 
loss into the regulatory capital requirement. In calculating capital adequacy, bank managers 
were supervised to be rigorously forward-looking and create possible safeguards in case of 
any economic events or changes in market conditions that could impact the bank’s financial 
stability. Although the guidelines were not mandated by law, bank managers were made 
clear that they are primarily responsible for keeping the bank protected with sufficient 
capital to respond to any risks. The implementation of Basel II Accord guidelines was 
expected to begin from year-end 2005 and complete by year-end 2008. The economic 
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downturn and financial crisis in 2007-2009, however, triggered the BCBS to revise and 
advance Basel II and led to the publication of Basel III Accord in 2010.    
Basel III The Basel III Accord was introduced in 2010 and revised in 2011 in 
response to the 2008-financial crisis to promote more resilient banks and banking systems. 
The BCBS concluded that the 2008 financial crisis was partially a result of the deficiencies 
in financial regulation and advanced the Basel II Accord by suggesting increasing bank 
liquidity and decreasing bank leverage. As did Basel II, Basel III suggests minimum 
requirements of capital adequacy of internationally active banks in order to control and 
supervise banks on risk management. The main concerns of Basel III focused on 
strengthening the global capital framework and introducing a global liquidity standard. 
Multiple methods were introduced and guidelines were provided, which include 1) raising 
the quality, consistency, and transparency of the capital base of banks, 2) enhancing risk 
coverage, 3) supplementing the risk-based capital requirement with leverage ratio, 4) 
addressing systemic risk and interconnectedness, and 5) reducing procyclicality and 
promoting countercyclical buffers. Detailed measures were introduced to ensure that banks 
become more resilient to shocks. One of the key objectives was to, again, promote forward 
looking provisioning. The BCBS supported changing accounting standards towards an 
expected loss approach in order to improve the effectiveness of financial reports to 
shareholders and regulators. The new guidelines of Basel III strongly suggest banks to be 
more transparent in assessing actual loan losses and to allow estimated losses into the 
provisions. The BCBS argues that the forward looking provisioning is less procyclical with 
the expected loss considered into the equation. An observation period began in 2011 and 
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the full transition and implementation of the Basel III Accord was expected to be done by 
2018, which later extended to March, 2019.       
 
Although not by law, the enforcement of Basel Accord provides a useful setting 
where the revisiting, recombining, and revamping knowledge mechanisms that are 
predicted to derive from a teaching opportunity in firm integrations were forced by 
institutions. Due to such regulatory enforcements, I anticipate a reduction in the salience 
of the learning by teaching effect after the financial crisis. Hereby, I argue: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The Basel Accord requirements provides all firms with learning that 
is likely to stem from teaching and, hence, decreases the salience in learning by 
teaching effect addressed in H1 
 
In the following sections, I present an empirical model that will examine the role 
of learning by teaching using data from the U.S. banking industry from 1998 to 2015. I test 
how the forecasting quality of bank managers at the acquiring bank is affected by the 
teaching opportunity from integration processes.    
 
Methodology 
I test the impact of reflective learning on a firm’s timeliness and accuracy in loan 
loss provisioning. In this section, I describe the comprehensive sample of U.S commercial 
banks prior to and after the promotion of forward-looking provisioning by BCBS, followed 
by model specifications and descriptions of key variables.  
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Data  
I use an extensive data set from the U.S. banking industry in years 1998 – 2015 
where it provides a unique setting of prior to and after the promotion of forward-looking 
loan loss provisioning by BCBS, initiated in 2004, allowing me to capture the deviation of 
firm’s ability to forecast with and without the learning by teaching effect.   
I use the FDIC Call reports and merge the data set with the Income Statements and 
Balance Sheet data collected from the WRDS database. Because banks are assigned with 
a unique id by the FDIC, it is convenient to match these different data sets and create an 
extensive panel that allows access to the financial performance, loan portfolio, and 
acquisition information of individual banks. The panel provides me with a total of 12129 
banks and 4665 acquisition cases over the years of 1998-2013. The reason why I take the 
bank as the unit of analysis instead of the holding company is because I intend to capture 
the immediate learning effect prior to the diffusion process measured as timeliness in loan 
loss provisioning. Because this particular data set is constructed at a quarterly level, I can 
look into instant changes in action made by bank managers in their loan loss provisioning 
standards. Another benefit of having a quarterly breakdown of the data is that it allows me 
to measure the beginning of quarter capital that affects the motivations of bank managers 
to manipulate provisions for smoothing earnings purposes.    
 
Model Specification 
The risk set is composed by each bank and its corresponding states in each quarter 
year. I adopt a forecasting model from accounting research to examine managers’ 
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capability in timely and accurate loan loss provisioning (Beatty and Liao, 2011; Bushman 
and Williams, 2015). This Delayed Expected Loss Recognition model departs from the 
incurred loss model in terms of the inclusion of future forecasts in its calculation of current 
provisions. The incurred loss model was required by the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) while criticized later 
by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) (2009) over the fact that procyclicality emerges due 
to the nature of the model deriving its measures from past events or environmental 
conditions of the past or at the statement date (Beatty and Liao, 2011; Bushman and 
Williams, 2015). There were elevated concerns over the fact that bank managers can take 
advantage of the amount of discretion that the incurred loss model allows by 
opportunistically delaying anticipated losses into current term provisions. When managers 
delay recognition of losses from current term provisions, the true risk level of the bank’s 
loan portfolio can be obscured (Bushman and Williams, 2015). The Delayed Expected Loss 
Recognition model is a devise that mitigates such concerns. By including the future term 
of expected loss into the equation of current term provisioning, timelier banks in terms of 
loan loss provisioning are recognized via the increased adjusted R-square compared to that 
of the base model that omits the future forecasting term. The below describes the two 
models: 
     𝐿𝐿𝑃G = 𝛽K + 𝛽I∆𝑁𝑃𝐿GEI + 𝛽O∆𝑁𝑃𝐿G + 	𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀																		(1)		 
   𝐿𝐿𝑃G = 𝛽K + 𝛽I∆𝑁𝑃𝐿GEI + 𝛽O∆𝑁𝑃𝐿G +	𝛽R∆𝑁𝑃𝐿GHI + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀						(2)			 
where,  𝐿𝐿𝑃G: loan loss provisions (change in allowance) at time t 
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∆	𝑁𝑃𝐿GEI:  change in non-performing loans at time t-1 ∆	𝑁𝑃𝐿G: change in non-performing loans at time t ∆	𝑁𝑃𝐿GHI: change in non-performing loans at time t+1 
 
The basic idea is that the increased adjusted R-square derived by deducting the 
adjusted R-square of model (1) from that of model (2) indicates greater timeliness in 
forecasting loan losses. Also, the Delayed Expected Loss Recognition model compares the 
strengths of coefficients across different time periods. The timelier and more accurately 
managers forecast, the greater correlation between recent and future data and a firm’s 
current term provisioning.  
I test the hypotheses by examining the timeliness of provisioning as a function of 
historic data of non-performing loans, forecasted data of future non-performing loans, and 
the exposure to affiliates through acquisitions. In order to capture learning by teaching 
effect following an acquisition decision, I interact the incremental non-performing loans at 
each term t+2, t+3, and t+4 with a dummy that indicates an acquisition made by a superior 
bank relative to the target bank. The assumption behind this argument is that the more 
superior the acquiring firm is to the target firm the greater amount of teaching and 
transferring knowledge instead of learning new capabilities from the target firm.  The 
reason why I use t+3 as the baseline period is to allow learning that initiates in the 
prepatation stage of teaching (t-1) and allow time for the learning to reflect in firm behavior 
(typically 1 year lag, which is 4 quarterly lags). The baseline model that I use is as the 
following:  
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𝐿𝐿𝑃GHR = 𝛽K + 𝛽I∆𝑁𝑃𝐿GHO + 𝛽O∆𝑁𝑃𝐿GHR +	𝛽R∆𝑁𝑃𝐿GHU + 𝛽U∆𝑁𝑃𝐿GHO ∗sup	 _𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽Z∆𝑁𝑃𝐿GHR ∗ sup	 _𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +	𝛽c∆𝑁𝑃𝐿GHU ∗sup	 _𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀																																																																																														(3) 
 
where,  𝐿𝐿𝑃GHR: loan loss provisions (change in allowance) at time t+3 ∆	𝑁𝑃𝐿GHO:  change in non-performing loans at time t+2 ∆	𝑁𝑃𝐿GHR: change in non-performing loans at time t+3 ∆	𝑁𝑃𝐿GHU:  change in non-performing loans at time t+4 sup	 _𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠G: acquisition flag in time t made by superior parents , 1 if a superior 
bank acquired a relatively low performing target bank in time t and 0 otherwise 
 
Following the work of Beatty & Liao (2011) and Bushman and Williams (2015), 
LLP is the loan loss provision divided by lagged term total loans and  ∆	𝑁𝑃𝐿 is the change 
in non-performing loans divided by lagged term total loans. This model is based on the 
assumption that bank managers on average accurately anticipate future losses according to 
the patterns of current loan payments and that bank managers have the discretion to include 
forward looking judgements into their quarterly loan loss provisions. Therefore, I can use 
the actual future non-performing loans as a measure of timely forecasting.  
 
Natural Shock  
The introduction of the Basel II Accord in 2004 provides a natural setting where 
many banks were required by regulation to update their accounting measures in financial 
reports. The BCBS released requirements that included the disclosure of qualitative 
information related to its procedures in regulatory financial reports as the majority of banks 
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did not document their procedures in the development of operational risk measurement and 
management system (Bushman and Williams, 2012). Risk management involves efforts 
that are embedded within the firm’s daily activities including identifying risks, measuring 
risks, developing a monitoring program, reporting risks to management and board, etc. 
Regulations emphasized the importance of providing transparent information related to 
operational risk management to market participants, forcing banks to document their 
activities in detail. This unique setting provides an advantageous position to this research 
that allows us to identify the effect of learning by teaching through the comparisons of two 
distinctly different environments: before and after the introduction of the 2004 Basel 
Accord. In particular, I look into the difference in forward-looking provisioning behavior 
of banks prior to and after the regulatory supervision. It is argued that firms who learned 
from teaching a newly acquired affiliate would improve in terms of timely forecasting 
before the introduction and enforcement of the Basel Accord guidelines. Yet, after the 
BCBS strongly promoted forward-looking provisioning in order to reduce procyclicality 
issues and protect banks from bank failure, the salient effect of learning by teaching expects 
to dampen as all banks begin to adopt the superior financial reporting standards even 
without the learning opportunity that roots from a teaching activity.      
 
Variables 
Dependent variable  In order to capture the performance improvement in loan 
loss forecasting, I take the loan loss provisions scaled by lagged total loans as the dependent 
variable at time t+3. 
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Independent variables Because the forecasting capabilities are anticipated to 
improve after a teaching experience during post-merger integrations and because the effect 
of learning by teaching is argued to be greater when the acquiring firm performs better than 
the acquired firm, superior parent acquisitions is interacted with the change in non-
performing loans at time t+2, t+3, and t+4 in consecutive terms. The superior parent 
acquisition variable is a binary dummy where 1 indicates a merger made by a bank whose 
performance is relatively superior to the target bank’s and 0 indicates otherwise. The 
parent’s performance superiority is measured in terms of the difference in return on assets 
(ROA) between the two firms.  
Control variables   total assets are included to control for size effects of each 
bank as size can affect the degree of engagement in acquisitions as well as learning 
capabilities. The typical state controls such as quarterly state personal income, state 
herfindahl index, number of parent level banks, and number of competitor banks are 
included into the analysis. Because of the unavailability of GDP data in quarter terms, I 
use state personal income to control for and economic microenvironment factors. In order 
to control for any diversification effects by acquiring a target bank with distant loan 
portfolios, I include a proximity measure, which is an angular separation measure using 
the loan composition and calculates the cosine value between the parent and target bank’s 
loan portfolios. The greater the proximity measure (maximum value=1) the closer the two 
loan portfolios, which implies similar capabilities between the two merged banks. Also, to 
control for any geographical expansion effects, I include a neighbor state dummy where 1 
indicates an acquisition between banks from adjacent states. Because loan loss 
provisioning is exposed to a bank manager’s discretion, there is a possibility that the bank 
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manager intends to delay loan loss recognition or to purposefully include future losses into 
the current term provisioning. In order to control for any opportunistic behavior by bank 
managers such as smoothing earnings, I include the tier 1 capital level, and beginning 
quarter earnings before loan loss provisions of the bank (Bushman & Williams, 2015). All 
the models include year and quarter dummies to control for any annual or quarterly industry 
specific effects.   
 
Results 
The summary statistics and correlation matrix for my explanatory variables and 
controls are shown in Tables 7 - 9. Due to concerns on the collinearity between the lagged 
terms and interactions, I orthogonalize the measures of concern that include the consecutive 
terms of incremental non-performing loans and its interactions.  
The results for the fixed effects regression using the Delayed Expected Loss 
Recognition model prior to the introduction of the Basel II Accord is shown in Table 10 
and are largely congruent with the theoretical arguments. The main effects of the 
incremental non-performing loans suggest a prevalent use of incurred loss provisioning 
where the main variable of delta non-performing loans at t+2 and t+3 show a positive and 
significant impact on the provisioning in t+3 while the loan losses in t+4 show no effect. 
When the main variables are interacted with acquisitions by superior parents, however, the 
magnitude of the incremental non-performing loan in t+4 becomes larger with a positive 
impact on current number of provisioning.  
Table 11 provides evidence that the behavior in loan risk management differs across 
parent banks depending on whether they acquire a high performer or low performer as the 
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target for merger. Again, this subsample analysis is conducted on banks prior to the 
introduction of Basel guidelines.  
The positive and significant effect of delta non-performing loans in t+4 indicate 
that a superior parent relative to the target is engaged in forward looking provisioning 
compared to inferior parents. The results imply that superior parents who try to improve 
the target’s performance, engage more in a teaching activity and learn how to be more 
prudent in terms of loan risk management while inferior parents lack the opportunity to 
learn by teaching. The significant and negative coefficients of the change in non-
performing loans at t+4 variable for the inferior parents suggest that many banks who lack 
a learning by teaching opportunity engaged in smoothing earnings rather than being 
cautious and careful in terms of their loan loss management. The t-test scores came back 
at 0.06 suggesting significant difference between the two parent groups at a 0.1 level.  
Table 12 shows the results for post-Basel Accord bank risk management. The 
results indicate much less magnitude in the interaction terms between delta non-performing 
loans at t+4 and parent superiority. To get a better idea of the behavioral difference between 
superior parents and inferior parents, I conducted a subsample test of which results are 
depicted in Table 13.  
The results show a significant loss in magnitude of the inferior parents engaging in 
smoothing earnings. In order to overcome the power issue that can be raised in the previous 
subsample analyses, I conducted a differences-in-difference test to investigate the impact 
of Basel enforcements restricting the data to only the firms that acquired another bank 
throughout the sample period. 
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I include the time viable where time=1 for post-Basel years while 0 in pre-Basel 
years. The dummy variable for treatment effect indicates 1 if the parent bank was relatively 
inferior to the target bank it acquired and 0 otherwise. The reasons I assigned the treatment 
variable in this fashion is because the Basel Accord is hypothesized to have impact on the 
behavior of inferior banks who were not following a forward-looking provisioning standard 
due to the lack of learning by teaching. Results suggest that the inferior parents improved 
in terms of their timeliness in loan loss provisioning after the introduction and enforcement 
of the Basel II Accord, which is congruent with the theoretical arguments in this Chapter.  
In order to check the relationship between a bank’s ROA and the propensity to 
adopt a forward-looking provisioning model, I ran a regression between subsamples of 
firms above the mean ROA of 0.0065916 and those below. Table 15 shows the behavior 
of superior firms generally taking on greater risks rather than using a careful provisioning 
model. Inferior firms on the other hand solidly use an incurred loss model in calculating 
their allowances. The correlation between firm ROA and the extent to which a bank would 
select to acquire a poor performing bank was 0.0048. Also the scatter plot in Figure 3 
suggests that the superiority in performance does not affect the degree to which a bank 
would engage in acquiring a poor or strong performer.      
  
Discussion 
Overall, the empirical findings support the theoretical perspectives of this study on 
learning by teaching, particularly at banks who acquire new affiliates. I hypothesize that 
bank managers become timelier in terms of recognizing current and future tem loan losses 
after they teach their new affiliate and, hence, reflect the forecasted amount into current 
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provisioning. Results are consistent with this argument in that non-performing loans in 
future terms (t+4) highly correlates with current term (t+3) provisions for firms that have 
superior skills in loan loss forecasting, namely firms that acquired a new bank and learned 
from their own knowledge during the course of improving the new affiliate’s performance. 
It is inferred from the results that banks who undergo an integration process learn from 
their teaching experience and improve their current routines and processes. The assumption 
behind the arguments is that superior parent banks relative to the acquired target bank 
engages in a greater degree of teaching compared to those who acquire high performing 
banks. This is because when parent banks acquire superior banks, there is greater amount 
of capabilities to learn from the target bank and due to the bounded rationality of managers 
at the parent bank the extent to which the parent bank can learn from a teaching activity 
becomes limited. The results support this argument by showing a positive and significant 
effect for the interaction terms between the incremental non-performing loans at t+4 and 
the dummy variable of acquisition by superior parent banks.      
Several supplementary analyses support the robustness of the primary tests. The 
robust check using a differences-in-difference model also indicate that superior parent 
banks were associated with timelier loan loss forecasting whereas this salience disappeared 
post-Basel. Results suggest that the theoretical arguments of the learning by teaching effect 
hold.      
 Taken together, this study makes a significant contribution to the large body of 
organizational learning literature by empirically testing the effect of a novel learning 
mechanism - learning by teaching – at the focal bank who directly acquired a new bank. A 
major concern within the organizational literature is the empirical difficulty in measuring 
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learning.  Many scholars infer learning by the positive correlation between an accumulation 
of activity or acquisition of new resources and capabilities with the improvement of firm 
performance. Learning, however, is neither a necessary or sufficient condition for 
improving firm performance. Performance improvement can result as pure luck without 
intentional behavioral changes by the firm (Tsang, 1997). Also, the increasingly complex 
and dynamic environment obscures the direct impact of firm learning on performance. It is 
argued that even with advanced analytical skills, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to 
pinpoint the causal effects and relationships between events (Tsang, 1997).  In the present 
study, therefore, I try to rule out the probability of luck as well as unobservable 
environmental impact on the efficacy of learning by measuring the increase in timeliness 
of bank’s decision making as, unlike other performance measures, timeliness is less prone 
to the effect of luck. Because it is challenging to capture the detailed mechanism or 
breakdown effect of learning from the increase in performance measures, I try to narrow 
down the identification of learning effect to the task level where managers can improve 
specific skills or processes as a result of learning by teaching. I do not argue that this paper 
survives from the concerns towards the validity issue of empirical constructs in learning. 
However, I acknowledge the issues that are prevalent in organizational learning research 
and attempt to make improvements, though in baby steps, to address such challenges and 
concerns.  While prior research extends our knowledge on ‘what’ ultimate goal improved 
as a result of organizational learning, overall, there has been lack of investigating ‘how’ 
firms improve after learning from a particular experience.  The present study explores such 
avenues and adopts and develops a model that provides us with more detailed information 
on organizational learning and its impact on firm performance. Rather than using a granular 
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measure of firm performance, the present study focuses on the bank manager’s cognitive 
advancement and development in current knowledge and its impact on a specific loan loss 
provisioning task. The theoretical perspectives help our comprehension on how individual 
learning can establish at the firm level. Through the bringing back and sharing stage of 
teaching, subject managers return to their original functional group with advanced 
knowledge and work collectively with their group members to improve any inefficient 
routines or processes. This brings our attention to the diffusion and establishment of 
organizational learning by connecting individual learning to group level learning and to a 
broader organizational level learning. The teaching activity is in particular useful to 
identify this connection between units within the organization and the diffusion of learning.    
Second, this study has implications on the literature in finance and corporate 
strategy by providing a thorough explanation to the motivations and implications of firm 
acquisitions. Also, making use of the available data prior to and after the 2001 and 2007 -
2009 financial crisis allows researchers to explore the change in firm behaviors after a 
natural shock. The unique dataset allows conducting a natural experiment on U.S. 
commercial banks that are mandated to report their financial performances on a quarterly 
basis. To establish the causal effect of learning by teaching on the timeliness in loan loss 
provisioning, I compare the acquisition made by relatively superior parents over terms 
before and after the introduction of Basel Accord, which was largely triggered by the crises. 
With data for the full census of banks in hand, there is much to be learned from the financial 
crisis for finance and strategy scholars by looking into behavioral differences across firms 
post-crisis. This study, in particular, benefits from the financial regulations that were 
strengthened after the focal events. The guidelines promoted by BCBS and the publication 
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of Basel II and III influenced the behavior of banks in risk management, which provided a 
natural setting where a treatment (enforcement of the Basel Accord) to all population 
dampened the learning effect of banks who were involved in a teaching opportunity prior 
to the overall treatment.   
Lastly, this study also suggests pragmatic implications for bank managers and 
financial regulators. Organizational researchers have long faced the challenge of finding 
the right balance between theoretical rigor and practitioner value (Miner & Mezias, 1996). 
Scholars highlight that the purpose of research in strategy and management should not 
overlook the need to help businesses and organizations solve immediate problems. The 
present study contributes to the literature in this matter by shedding light on a particular 
learning mechanism that was, in fact, lost inside the black box of integrations. With the full 
spectrum of organizational learning mechanisms taking place, bank managers can 
consciously look after the benefits they can rake from an integration process or annual 
employee trainings. As mentioned in the McKinsey Quarterly article (October, 2010), 
leaders at organizations often overlook the importance of connecting teaching materials 
from training programs to new ways of working. Although one might think that it is the 
knowledge transfer from the leader to the subordinate that creates most value from training 
programs, the authors (Smet, Mcgurk, & Schwartz, 2010) advise that the greatest effect 
from training is derived from leaders reflecting upon knowledge, advancing their 
understanding of the focal knowledge, and bringing back the learning to change 
organizational behavior and improve firm performance. The results from this study also 
provide implications to the financial regulators. The empirical test in this study shows 
direct effect of public policies. The behavioral change in banks’ loan loss provisioning 
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provides us with an idea of how the Basel Accord had actually promoted forward-looking 
provisioning in order to protect banks against systemic failure. By theorizing and 
documenting the pattern in organizations’ actions, regulators can find validity and 
legitimacy in the regulations that they endorse. 
The present study, yet, awaits refinement in future work. Although I try to control 
for bank managers’ opportunistic behavior by using the tier 1 capital and beginning quarter 
earnings data, there are more factors that would affect the motivations of bank managers 
to smooth earnings. Also, future research may find further opportunities by looking at 
different levels of analysis in order to identify the diffusion of learning by teaching. For 
instance, one could empirically test a bridging hypothesis between task level individual 
bank learning and the change in the higher level organizational behavior using the bank 
holding company data. This would allow the researcher to document the constituent bank’s 
behavioral change, which results from a learning experience, as well as the parent level 
learning by investigating other existing constituent banks’ behavioral change. As the 
theoretical perspective on organizational learning by teaching is relatively new to the 
literature, I believe various intriguing issues await future research.    
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Chapter 6 
Summary and Future Directions 
  
Summary 
In this dissertation, I developed a theoretical perspective on a learning mechanism, 
namely learning by teaching, that has been overlooked in organizational studies while 
widely studied at the individual level learning in psychology or education research.  
First, I offer the theoretical background of learning by teaching and connect multi-
level analyses and theory that provides insight and logic for the application of the proposed 
learning mechanism to the organizational context (Chapter 2). In particular, I begin with 
the anteceding concepts from organizational studies that build grounds for the learning by 
teaching mechanism, which is the center of interest of this dissertation. Then I introduce 
theory from education research on tutor learning, which describes the learning benefits that 
teachers gain during the art of preparing teaching materials and interacting with students 
in the classroom. By borrowing insight from group level learning research, I provide a 
middle ground for establishing the proposed learning mechanism at the organizational level. 
Finally, in Chapter 2, I propose the restoration of knowledge, reconfiguration of knowledge, 
and revamping of knowledge as the three fundamental envisioned mechanisms of 
organizational learning by teaching.  
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Chapter 3 provides a brief backdrop to the empirical context where I test my 
theoretical arguments in Chapter 4 and 5 by summarizing the core financial measures; non-
performing loans, loan loss provisions, and charge offs; that are useful in constructing the 
main variables.  
I then empirically test the theoretical arguments by specifying the teaching activity 
in business as in training opportunities when a parent firm acquires another firm and 
encounters needs for training new employees of the systems, culture, processes, and 
standards of the parent firm in order to integrate the two potentially different firms (Chapter 
4). Overall, findings from the analyses provide supportive evidence for the learning by 
teaching effect in the context of post-merger integrations. The results of a longitudinal 
panel data of U.S. commercial banks from years 1998 to 2007 suggest that bank holding 
companies, which are the parent banks, improve in terms of loan quality performance after 
experiencing an integration process. The particular analysis controls for any inflow of 
superior technology that the parent may learn from the acquired bank and the novelty in 
this analysis lies where I exclude all possibilities of such alternative learning mechanisms 
by investigating the performance improvement of the affiliates of the parent bank that 
excludes the actual bank who acquired the target bank. The learning by teaching effect 
arguably starts occurring prior to the full integration since reflection takes place mainly 
during the preparation stage of teaching. Therefore, any diffusion or synergy effects 
derived from the acquisition are ruled out from the analysis as the timeline I explore is one 
year after the actual announcement of acquisition allowing sufficient amount of time for 
the diffusion of learning by teaching but excluding the rest. Results show that acquisitions 
made by superior firms relative to the target firm are associated with greater degree of 
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learning by teaching presumably because the extent to teach another entity becomes greater 
under this given condition. Also, I find that similarity in skillsets among current affiliates 
of the parent firm enhances the degree of learning by teaching due to the fact that related 
knowledge facilitates the diffusion process. Frequent learning chances, on the other hand, 
that come from frequent integration activities reduce the amount of errors and ultimately 
dampen the effect of learning by teaching. Time compression diseconomies to the 
opportunity of learning by teaching appears as it takes time to accumulate errors once they 
are corrected.  
Finally, in Chapter 5, I extend the empirical model to test the efficacy of learning 
by teaching at an individual task level. I investigate the improvement in timely loan loss 
forecasting following an integration process, which involves a considerable amount of 
teaching opportunities. Again, I use a longitudinal panel data of U.S. commercial banks 
between the period of 1998 and 2013. This data set finds its novelty in offering a unique 
research setting that allows me to test the behavioral difference of firms prior to and after 
the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis. Results show that bank managers become timelier in 
recognizing loan losses and reflecting it into their current term provisioning after 
experiencing an integration with another bank. The findings imply that bank managers 
learn about inefficiencies in current processes or standards during the course of teaching 
another entity and change their behavior to overcome the errors. The effect that was salient 
for banks who acquired another bank disappears after the promotion of forward-looking 
provisioning by the BCBS after the financial crisis. Arguably, institutions can act as an 
alternative to learning by teaching by enforcing the type of learning that is expected from 
a teaching activity.  
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Based on the findings and theoretical development, this dissertation offers a number 
of contributions to the organizational learning and corporate strategy literature. First, this 
dissertation finds its novelty in identifying a critical theoretical construct associated with 
organizational learning which has been neglected in the strategy literature. In particular, 
the present dissertation recognizes the value of knowledge restoration and capability 
reinforcement through the process of learning by teaching. Second, the theoretical 
perspective of this dissertation eases the traditional theoretical premise prevalent in the 
learning literature that knowledge flow from the entity with greater knowledge stock to the 
entity with smaller knowledge stock by recognizing benefits to the firm who transfers its 
superior capabilities to another. The interaction of two firms not necessarily creates a 
learning opportunity for the entity with less knowledge but also learning benefits are 
granted to the entity with the source of information or technology. Third, this dissertation 
contributes to the evolutionary literature by expanding our understanding of dynamic 
capabilities and absorptive capacity. In order to achieve an understanding of the full 
spectrum of organizational learning, this paper highlights the role of absorptive capacity in 
the efficacy of learning by teaching. Because firms that accumulated experience and 
knowledge are built with greater level of absorptive capacity, it becomes easier for those 
firms to learn back lost knowledge and restore the focal knowledge at a higher efficiency. 
The learning by teaching mechanism highlights this broader role of absorptive capacity by 
shedding light on the restoration and reconfiguration of knowledge that results from a 
teaching activity. Finally, this dissertation provides pragmatic implications to firm 
managers. Although this dissertation identifies the impact of learning by teaching on 
different aspects of firm performance, it is important that practitioners acknowledge the 
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efficacy of learning by teaching and consciously realize the learning results. Boud et al 
(1985) emphasizes the role of consciousness that impacts the effectiveness of learning. 
Unconscious processes do not guarantee making active changes due to the fact that the 
actor is not aware of the learning that he or she encounters (Boud et al; 1985). Therefore, 
this dissertation alerts practitioners of the potential loss that they would suffer from by not 
realizing and actively seeking for improvement opportunities that can be derived from a 
teaching, in other words training, opportunity. In the following section, I discuss the future 
research directions of this dissertation.  
 
Discussion and Future Directions 
A considerable group of scholars raised the issue of construct validity issues and 
conceptual misunderstandings within the organizational learning literature (Argyris & 
Schön, 1978, 1996; Brown & Duguid, 2000; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Gephart, Marsick, Van 
Buren, & Spiro, 1996; Huber, 1991; Isaacs & Senge, 1992; March & Olsen, 1976; Meyer, 
1982; Miner & Mezias, 1996; Tsang, 1997; Yang, Watkins, & Marsick, 2004).  In efforts 
to clarify the conceptual understanding of organizational learning, Tsang (1997) offers us 
with a good summary of the definitions of organizational learning provided in the literature. 
Organizational learning can be interpreted from diverse perspectives such as the cultural, 
cognitive, and behavioral viewpoint.  
The present study follows the definition of learning suggested by Levitt and March 
(1988) where they state organizational learning as the following: 
 
“…organizations are seen as learning by encoding inferences from history into 
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routines that guide behavior”  
 
Here, learning is defined from the cognitive and behavioral perspective where future 
changes in firm behavior finds its roots from a configuration of past and current knowledge. 
The theoretical development of learning by teaching extends our understanding on the 
conceptual development of organizational learning by providing a specific mechanism to 
which firms reflect on past knowledge and make changes into future behaviors.   
Empirically, however, several challenges remain and a more rigorous approach 
may be at demand. In Chapter 5, the discretion in loan loss provisioning may be inheritably 
biased as managers can strategically use their discretion not to report based on future-
provisioning in order to appeal to stakeholders or outside investors. Although I attempt to 
control for opportunism using capital measures, endogeneity issues that find its roots from 
the unobservable motivations of bank managers still remain. In future work, I aim to 
develop a computational model that may address these issues.  
As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, the detailed mechanism of organizational 
learning is difficult to capture with quantitative data. Future research may explore the 
efficacy of learning by teaching using qualitative methods that include surveys, interviews, 
or text analysis in order to examine the individual mechanisms of restoration, 
reconfiguration, and revamping of knowledge. A survey questionnaire designed for future 
use is included in the Appendix section at the back of this dissertation.  
Lastly, this dissertation opens up a new avenue for researchers to explore the impact 
of teaching in various business contexts. This dissertation limits its focus on a distinct 
business setting, which is the integration process between two merged firms. Teaching, 
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however, applies to a broader context in business. While firm managers may have 
unconsciously overlooked upon the act of teaching within the corporate world and 
neglected a significant chunk of learning in the black-box, the benefit of teaching can, in 
fact, be discovered in many more activities such as annual employee trainings, consulting, 
auditing, marketing, and evaluation processes.  
Taken together, in future work, I aspire to develop a thorough theoretical 
perspective on the fascinating learning by teaching mechanism with greater rigor in 
empirical methods.  
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[Figure 1] The link between pathology of knowledge and mechanisms of reflective 
learning 
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[Figure 2] Decomposition of non-performing loans 
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[Figure 3] Scatter plot of relationship between firm performance and different 
choice of target firm 
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[Table 1] Difference between learning by doing and learning by teaching 
 
Learning by doing Learning by teaching 
• Initial driver: Goal driven 
• Action based learning 
• Learning process: Unconscious 
acquisition of tacit knowledge 
Mechanisms 
• Acquisition of new information 
 
• Initial driver: Unintentional, process 
driven 
• Content based learning  
• Learning process: Conscious learning 
through codification of knowledge 
Mechanisms 
• Restoration of old knowledge 
• Reconfiguring existing knowledge 
• Revamping current knowledge 
reservoir 
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[Table 2] Summary statistics: Explanatory variables 
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[Table 3] Summary statistics: Control variables 
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[Table 4] Pairwise correlation of independent variables 
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[Table 5] Fixed effects model regressions (Dependent variable: Loan quality) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Parent Superiority                     0.030*        0.030*        0.031*        0.032*  0.032       0.314***       0.387***
              (1.649) (1.654) (1.686) (1.76) (1.627) (4.584) (5.066)
Parent_Target Proximity                             -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 0.02 0.072 0.136
                            (0.196) (0.222) (0.218) (0.1) (0.359) (0.671)
Parent_Affiliate Variance                                           518.931 519.646 523.409     686.165**     587.718*  
                                          (1.625) (1.627) (1.631) (2.131) (1.808)
Multiple Acquisition                                                         0.033 0.033 0.03 0.042
                                                        (1.117) (1.123) (1.008) (1.407)
Superiority*Proximity                                                                       -0.147 -0.566 -0.995
                                                                      (0.119) (0.458) (0.796)
Superiority*Variance                                                                                          -4.615***      -4.314***
                                                                                    (4.298) (3.986)
Superiority*Multiple_Acq                                                                                                        -0.016** 
                                                                                                  (2.153)
Total Asset      34.571***      34.571***      34.111***      29.397***      28.213***      28.291***      23.109**      22.317** 
(4.122) (4.122) (3.915) (3.202) (3.053) (3.054) (2.482) (2.397)
Herf_State     938.751***     938.751***     941.840***     879.820***     877.883***     877.362***     928.797***     947.747***
(2.937) (2.937) (2.943) (2.73) (2.725) (2.722) (2.89) (2.95)
NumBHC_State 0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.084 -0.09 -0.091 0.011 0.026
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.124) (0.134) (0.136) (0.017) (0.038)
Pincome_State 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0.376) (0.376) (0.371) (0.451) (0.357) (0.357) (0.364) (0.29)
NumBanks_State -0.112 -0.112 -0.112 -0.045 -0.024 -0.023 -0.104 -0.095
(0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.069) (0.037) (0.035) (0.16) (0.147)
NumState_BHC     118.261***     118.261***     118.681***     101.895***     100.353***     100.375***      99.206***     104.640***
(3.398) (3.398) (3.403) (2.802) (2.758) (2.758) (2.735) (2.88)
NumBanks_BHC      32.034***      32.034***      31.980***      30.199***      29.982***      29.987***      30.390***      30.439***
(2.897) (2.897) (2.891) (2.718) (2.698) (2.698) (2.743) (2.749)
NumPoorAcq_BHC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0.84) (0.84) (0.854) (0.831) (1.386) (1.227) (1.199) (1.012)
Constant 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0.183) (0.183) (0.186) (0.273) (0.549) (0.56) (0.726) (0.957)
Observations 2559 2559 2559 2559 2559 2559 2559 2559
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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[Table 6] Heckman selection model (Dependent variable: Loan quality) 
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[Table 7] Summary statistics: Explanatory variables 
 
 
Variable         Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ΔNPLt+2 205,575 0.0005148 0.6545797 -153.6851 247.5346 
ΔNPLt+3 203,353 0.0004889 0.6581559 -153.6851 247.5346 
ΔNPLt+4 201,194 0.0004821 0.6617104 -153.6851 247.5346 
Superior Parent 
Flag 1,532 0.6605744 0.473669 0 1 
 
 
[Table 8] Summary statistics: Control variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
totasset 212,156 736860.1 1.02E+07 781 6.62E+08 
stpincome 212,156 2.62E+08 2.41E+08 1.22E+07 1.27E+09 
stherf 212,156 0.1196327 0.0997295 0.0114157 0.8506912 
stnumbanks 212,156 336.8105 223.1089 4 843 
loan proximity 212,156 0.0068617 0.0808369 0 1 
nghbr dummy 212,156 0.9990646 0.0303242 0 1 
# prior acq 212,156 0.0954628 1.210897 0 65 
tier1cap 212,156 57815.33 689847.9 -40164 4.37E+07 
boqcap 212,156 55142.59 658572.6 -563 4.19E+07 
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[Table 9] Pairwise correlation of independent variables 
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[Table 10] Fixed effects model regression: Prior to Basel accord 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
ΔNPLt+2 0.169*** 0.176*** 0.178*** 0.179*** 0.190*** 0.155***
0.046 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.044
ΔNPLt+3 0.279*** 0.303*** 0.305*** 0.286*** 0.288*** 0.186***
0.041 0.057 0.057 0.059 0.059 0.055
ΔNPLt+4 0.019 0.018 0.02 0.038 0.044
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.033 0.03
Superior Parent Flag 0.109** 0.108** 0.114** 0.107**
0.052 0.052 0.052 0.047
ΔNPLt+2*Sup 0.047 0.016 0.155***
0.039 0.045 0.043
ΔNPLt+3*Sup -0.064 0.169***
0.047 0.049
ΔNPLt+4*Sup 0.325***
0.033
Total assets 0.268** 0.267** 0.280** 0.292** 0.289** 0.240*
0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.124
stpincome -0.176* -0.178* -0.176* -0.170* -0.166* -0.194**
0.097 0.098 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.089
stherf -0.429 -0.415 -0.439 -0.421 -0.428 -0.706*
0.442 0.443 0.442 0.442 0.442 0.405
stnumbanks -81.861 -83.793 -86.251 -56.41 -51.999 -137.246
111.452 111.648 111.268 113.992 113.938 104.518
loan proximity 0.574*** 0.580*** 0.554*** 0.552*** 0.547*** 0.288*
0.184 0.185 0.185 0.185 0.184 0.171
nghbr dummy 0.161 0.158 0.157 0.15 0.159 0.129
0.099 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.09
# prior acq 0.178 0.165 0.145 0.125 0.104 0.010
0.517 0.518 0.516 0.516 0.516 0.472
tier1cap -20.435*** -20.485*** -20.311*** -20.072*** -20.367*** -15.561***
2.966 2.972 2.963 2.968 2.974 2.761
boqcap -2.737 -2.653 -2.891 -2.769 -2.857 -3.328*
2.029 2.035 2.031 2.033 2.032 1.858
Year/Quarter Dummies Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.183 0.102 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.026***
0.153 0.077 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
Observations 203102 200910 1475 1475 1475 1475
R-squared 0.0006 0.0052 0.341 0.3428 0.3453 0.4539
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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[Table 11] Subsample regression: Superior parents vs inferior parents, prior to 
Basel 
 
 
 
 
 
Superior Inferior
ΔNPLt+2 37.754*** 24.151*
9.283 14.388
ΔNPLt+3 22.976** 24.689*
9.359 13.487
ΔNPLt+4 46.370*** -100.378***
9.62 10.328
Total assets 0.319*** -0.067
0.085 0.122
stpincome -0.020* -0.003
0.012 0.019
stherf 0.33 0.43
0.315 0.499
stnumbanks -6.461 14.437
16.581 24.569
loan proximity 0.138 -0.679**
0.331 0.301
nghbr dummy -0.213* -0.923***
0.122 0.187
# prior acq -0.790 -0.963
0.483 0.685
tier1cap -8.298*** -0.786
1.993 1.517
boqcap 9.173*** 8.461***
1.93 2.202
Year/Quarter Dummies Included Yes Yes
Constant 0.385 1.139***
0.369 0.394
Observations 976 499
R-squared 0.0938 0.4111
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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[Table 12] Fixed effects model regression: Post Basel accord 
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[Table 13] Subsample regression: Superior parents vs inferior parents, Post Basel 
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[Table 14] Differences-in-difference analysis  
(Delayed Expected Loss Recognition Model: Time=1 if Post Basel II Accord, 0 
otherwise; Treatment=1 if Acquisition made by Superior Parents, 0 if Acquisition made 
by Inferior Parents) 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ΔNPLt+2 14.353* 14.569* 14.569* 34.276*** 34.387*** 61.635*** 81.944*** 94.469***
7.89 8.112 8.112 10.05 10.051 13.175 14.508 15.832
ΔNPLt+3 44.475*** 42.756*** 42.756*** 58.921*** 59.015*** 100.482*** 120.359*** 100.612***
6.871 8.294 8.294 10.266 10.268 12.765 15.886 17.865
ΔNPLt+4 -2.573 -2.573 0.656 0.767 11.343 81.818*** 100.009***
5.636 5.636 6.329 6.331 7.58 10.682 11.562
time 2.012*** 1.806*** 1.823*** 1.862*** 1.860*** 1.884***
0.198 0.214 0.215 0.212 0.203 0.202
treat -0.074 -0.041 -0.047 -0.035 -0.044
0.049 0.061 0.06 0.057 0.057
did -0.087 -0.066 0.002 -0.012
0.098 0.097 0.093 0.092
ΔNPLt+2*time -55.321*** -48.476*** -67.815***
19.158 18.636 21.332
ΔNPLt+3*time -107.777*** -97.840*** -59.982**
18.512 18.74 23.343
ΔNPLt+4*time -0.892 -41.204*** -80.447***
14.136 14.282 17.181
ΔNPLt+2*treat -78.869*** -107.626***
18.447 24.998
ΔNPLt+3*treat -98.801*** -82.900***
18.242 24.114
ΔNPLt+4*treat -131.049*** -154.425***
13.332 15.973
ΔNPLt+2*did 42.493
38.428
ΔNPLt+3*did -56.705
36.628
ΔNPLt+4*did 100.370***
30.584
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Total assets 0.070** 0.072** 0.072** 0.055 0.056 0.084** 0.092** 0.092**
0.032 0.033 0.033 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.037 0.038
stpincome -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.005 0.006 0.002 -0.006 -0.013
0.026 0.027 0.027 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.028 0.028
stherf 0.328 0.329 0.329 0.539* 0.530* 0.520* 0.474 0.479
0.271 0.274 0.274 0.316 0.316 0.311 0.297 0.294
stnumbanks 138.869** 141.865** 141.865** 136.191 140.897 147.792* 157.273* 164.540**
68.472 68.9 68.9 85.547 85.722 84.576 81.363 80.774
loan proximity -0.015 -0.013 -0.013 0.387** 0.388** 0.301* 0.109 0.06
0.052 0.052 0.052 0.172 0.172 0.17 0.163 0.162
nghbr dummy -0.079 -0.074 -0.074 -0.034 -0.035 -0.068 -0.107 -0.091
0.07 0.07 0.07 0.089 0.089 0.087 0.084 0.083
# prior acq 0.361 0.353 0.353 0.013 0.005 0.174 -0.077 -0.048
0.397 0.399 0.399 0.481 0.481 0.474 0.454 0.450
tier1cap 0.79 0.851 0.851 3.875 3.922 2.956 3.803* 3.398
1.779 1.804 1.804 2.387 2.388 2.359 2.256 2.255
boqcap 0.304 0.279 0.279 -2.16 -2.21 -1.816 -1.546 -1.486
1.088 1.094 1.094 1.548 1.549 1.524 1.458 1.444
Year/Quarter Dummies Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.058 -0.074 -0.074 -0.619 -0.644 -0.488 -0.387 -0.334
0.297 0.3 0.3 0.412 0.413 0.408 0.39 0.387
Observations 3320 3283 3283 2579 2579 2579 2579 2579
R-squared 0.3021 0.2997 0.2997 0.325 0.3255 0.3507 0.4091 0.4232
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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[Table 15] Subsample regression: Superior banks vs inferior banks, Prior to Basel 
(Delayed Expected Loss Recognition Model, using mean=0.0066) 
 
 
 
Superior Inferior
ΔNPLt+2 -33.421*** 21.932***
0.441 3.821
ΔNPLt+3 -56.937*** 13.744***
1.506 3.846
ΔNPLt+4 -166.922*** -0.009
1.459 0.362
Total assets -0.277 -1.173
1.783 2.866
stpincome -0.164* -0.339***
0.091 0.125
stherf 5.528*** -0.41
1.931 2.858
stnumbanks -444.769*** 101.093
98.465 135.826
loan proximity -0.819 0.009
2.275 3.603
nghbr dummy 0.05 -1.408
5.865 10.469
# prior acq -6.93 5.55
13.95 27.59
tier1cap 26.903*** 10.368
6.86 22.931
boqcap -14.384*** -9.301
5.286 22.399
Year/Quarter Dummies Included Yes Yes
Constant 0.099 2.343
5.92 10.521
Observations 89672 111238
R-squared 0.1524 0.0005
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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[Table 16] Subsample regression2: Superior banks vs inferior banks, Prior to Basel  
(Delayed Expected Loss Recognition Model, using median=0.0059) 
 
 
Superior Inferior
ΔNPLt+2 -32.878*** 20.445***
0.419 4.017
ΔNPLt+3 -54.194*** 10.293**
1.43 4.048
ΔNPLt+4 -164.126*** -0.06
1.386 0.38
Total assets -0.211 -1.507
1.563 3.321
stpincome -0.157* -0.364***
0.081 0.137
stherf 5.141*** -0.588
1.741 3.155
stnumbanks -406.265*** 118.647
88.358 149.617
loan proximity -0.741 0.016
2.031 4.057
nghbr dummy 0.073 -1.535
5.396 11.481
# prior acq -63197.131 72940.69
124346.41 325517.709
tier1cap 27.344*** 10.655
6.423 24.561
boqcap -14.358*** -9.852
5.015 23.991
Year/Quarter Dummies Included
Constant -0.069 2.567
5.445 11.539
Observations 100346 100564
R-squared 0.148 0.0005
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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APPENDIX 
 
The Basel II Accord 
 
The Basel II Accord first introduces the concept of forward-looking provisioning 
in its guidelines to protect banks from bank failure. To provide the reader with detailed 
information of the Basel II Accord, I attached below direct quotes from the document.  
 
Directly from the Basel II Accord (Kane, 2007): 
“Detailed criteria 669. This section describes a series of quantitative standards that will 
apply to internally generated operational risk measures for purposes of calculating the 
regulatory minimum capital charge. (a) Any internal operational risk measurement system 
must be consistent with the scope of operational risk defined by the Committee in 
paragraph 644 and the loss event types defined in Annex 9. (b) Supervisors will require the 
bank to calculate its regulatory capital requirement as the sum of expected loss (EL) and 
unexpected loss (UL), unless the bank can demonstrate that it is adequately capturing EL 
in its internal business practices. That is, to base the minimum regulatory capital 
requirement on UL alone, the bank must be able to demonstrate to the satisfaction of its 
national supervisor that it has measured and accounted for its EL exposure. (c) A bank’s 
risk measurement system must be sufficiently ‘granular’ to capture the major drivers of 
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operational risk affecting the shape of the tail of the loss estimates. 148 (d) Risk measures 
for different operational risk estimates must be added for purposes of calculating the 
regulatory minimum capital requirement. However, the bank may be permitted to use 
internally determined correlations in operational risk losses across individual operational 
risk estimates, provided it can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the national supervisor that 
its systems for determining correlations are sound, implemented with integrity, and take 
into account the uncertainty surrounding any such correlation estimates (particularly in 
periods of stress). The bank must validate its correlation assumptions using appropriate 
quantitative and qualitative techniques. (e) Any operational risk measurement system must 
have certain key features to meet the supervisory soundness standard set out in this section. 
These elements must include the use of internal data, relevant external data, scenario 
analysis and factors reflecting the business environment and internal control systems. (f) 
A bank needs to have a credible, transparent, well-documented and verifiable approach for 
weighting these fundamental elements in its overall operational risk measurement system. 
For example, there may be cases where estimates of the 99.9th percentile confidence 
interval based primarily on internal and external loss event data would be unreliable for 
business lines with a heavy-tailed loss distribution and a small number of observed losses. 
In such cases, scenario analysis, and business environment and control factors, may play a 
more dominant role in the risk measurement system. Conversely, operational loss event 
data may play a more dominant role in the risk measurement system for business lines 
where estimates of the 99.9th percentile confidence interval based primarily on such data 
are deemed reliable. In all cases, the bank’s approach for weighting the four fundamental 
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elements should be internally consistent and avoid the double counting of qualitative 
assessments or risk mitigants already recognized in other elements of the framework”. 
 
Survey design for future qualitative studies 
Questionnaire  
• Has the organization that you work at involved in mergers and acquisitions during 
your term of office?  
o Yes 
If yes, how many times? ___ 
o No 
• At what level of institution did you work for?  
o Branch level at the acquiring firm 
o Regional office level at the acquiring firm 
o Corporate parent level at the acquiring firm 
o Branch level at the target firm 
o Regional office level at the target firm 
o Corporate parent level at the target firm 
• What is your role at your bank?  
• On average, how many training materials did you use for each training that entails 
an acquisition? 
o On average, how many new training materials did you produce for each 
training that entails an acquisition? 
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o On average, how many old training materials were updated for each 
training that entails an acquisition? 
• On average, how many functional leaders are involved in a single training 
program that entails an acquisition? 
• On average, how many functional divisions are involved in a single training 
program that entails an acquisition?  
• On the scale of 1-10 how much new knowledge do you think you got access to 
during the preparation stage of the training program?  
• On the scale of 1-10 how much do you think you revisited old knowledge during 
the preparation stage of the training program?  
• On average, how many functional leaders engaged in the actual transfer of 
knowledge?  
• On average, how many hours did you spend a week prior to the training program? 
• On average, how many days did you work prior to the training program?  
• On average, how many hours did you spend a week on the training program? 
• On average, how many days did you work on the training program?  
• On the scale of 1-10 how much discretion do loan managers have in loan risk 
management?  
• On the scale of 1-10 to what extent do the functional managers involved in 
training have the opportunity to communicate report the outcome to the corporate 
level?  
• On the scale of 1-10 to what extent do you think your institution learns from 
teaching the acquired banks?  
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